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German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for 
a New First Amendment? 
Uli Widmaier* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Should the First Amendment be rethought? Are the values of free 
speech endangered by maintaining the traditional interpretation of 
the First Amendment? Is it appropriate to allow the modern mass 
media to function as a private market system? Are we blinded by the 
power of the libertarian tradition to the shortcomings of press and 
broadcast? Has the time come to drop what once was an empirical 
assumption but has long since rigidified into dogma, namely, that 
freedom from state interference best serves the ideals behind the First 
Amendment? 
Today, the 'Worthy Tradition" celebrated by Harry Kalven seems to 
reign triumphant in the courts.1 What controversies remain in a free 
speech regime under which the defenses against state interference are 
so strong that the permissibility of burning the American flag is, in 
Professor Akhil Amar's words, as "easy a case in modern constitutional 
law as any I know"?2 The theoretical debates, the ideological and 
philosophical struggles surrounding the First Amendment, may seem 
increasingly irrelevant in the face of the Supreme Court's commitment 
to a First Amendment jurisprudence of virtually insurmountable de-
fensive capabilities against the state. The Supreme Court recently reit-
erated the core principles of that jurisprudence: 
*B.A., M.A., Brown University (1990);].0., Yale Law School (1994). Associate, Goldberg, Kohn, 
Bell, Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd. 
1 See HARRY KALVEN, jR., A WORTHY TRADITION-FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988). 
Kalven's ''Worthy Tradition" is the evolution of First Amendment law during the twentieth century 
into a powerful "shield around the speaker." Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 7I 
IowA L. REv. 1405, 1409 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech] (discussing Kalven's analysis). Fiss 
has aptly called this evolution, as described by Kalven, "an example of the law working itself pure." 
OWEN M. Fxss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 6 (1996) [hereinafter Fxss, IRONY]. 
2 Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. 
L. REv. 124, 125 (1992) (describing Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). 
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As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental reg-
ulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere 
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The 
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a demo-
cratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit 
of censorship. 3 
America has achieved a free speech paradise. Or has it? 
Some scholars feel that the realization of this laissez-faire perfection 
does not serve the values underlying the First Amendment.4 They 
argue that the Supreme Court's free speech orthodoxy has neglected 
the social costs of condemning the state to virtually total inaction. 
Preventing the state from taking positive action in the free speech 
arena eliminates the one force in society that could efficiently foster 
crucial speech values that are unachievable in any immediate way by 
private action, especially private action motivated by monetary gain.5 
3 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (holding that 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, broadly prohibiting indecent and pat-
ently offensive materials on the Internet, violate the First Amendment). 
4 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REv. 949, 954 (1995), 
for a summary of some arguments of "the new speech regulators," among whom she includes 
Cass R. Sunstein, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Mari J. Matsuda, Owen M. Fiss, J.M. Balkin, Charles 
R. Lawrence, III, and Frederick Schauer. 
5 "[T]o join in the attack on the activist state that is so fashionable today would expose us to 
an even greater danger: politics dominated by the market. We are left without a remedy." Owen 
M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 792 (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?]. In 
that article, Fiss defends a First Amendment that embraces an activist state against "decentraliza-
tion" attacks from both the political left and the right. See id. at 790-94. However, the dissatisfac-
tion with a purely defensive understanding of the First Amendment is most often seen as a 
reaction to the alleged appropriation of traditional First Amendment doctrine by the political 
right. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. CoLO. 
L. REv. 935 ( 1993); J.M. Balkin, Sume Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375. Schauer explains some of the political considerations underlying 
this dissatisfaction: 
As recent attacks on the public-private distinction in the context of freedom of speech 
have reminded us, the non-involvement of government does not leave an open and 
unregulated marketplace, but rather a marketplace regulated by all of the economic, 
social, cultural, and psychological forces that operate even when the state does not. And 
as long as we can imagine that there are winners and losers in economic, social, cultural, 
and psychological wars, then it should come as no surprise that those who would expect 
to win in these wars would be quite comfortable with keeping government out, while 
those who would expect to lose in these wars might expect that intervention would do 
them more good than harm. 
Schauer, supra <1-t 950 (citations omitted). 
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Thus, a dichotomy has opened up. On the one hand, there are the 
positive core values underlying the right to free speech, such as robust 
public debate about issues of political importance-the very lifeblood 
of this democracy and the bedrock of the First Amendment as tradi-
tionally conceived.6 On the other hand, there is today's First Amend-
ment-certainly awesome as the pinnacle of the noble evolutionary 
history that Kalven has traced, but now perhaps becoming anemic, not 
really standing for anything, sapped of affirmative value and visceral 
appeal by the anti-government dogmatism that is its central teaching. 
There are so many things in the speech arena that we want to improve 
or change but that the state is incapable of addressing due to the 
pervasive prohibitions against state action imposed by the current First 
Amendment-for example, the quality of television (especially chil-
dren's television), the manner in which individuals and corporations 
contribute to political parties and campaign funds, the embarrassingly 
low level of political debate, the frightening ease with which minors 
can gain access to inappropriate materials on the Internet, and the 
insidious effects of pornography and hate speech-that the price of 
living with these prohibitions may simply have become too high. 7 
Recently, two preeminent legal scholars, Professors Owen M. Fiss and 
Cass R. Sunstein, have provided reassessments of the First Amendment 
along these lines. 8 They have called for an abandonment of the tradi-
tional First Amendment fixation on restricting state action, advocating 
instead a new First Amendment which promotes the state's active 
pursuit of those substantive values that, in their view, are constitutive 
of the right to free speech itself.9 
In a short book that is "almost magisterial in its simplicity"10-to use 
the words with which he characterizes the First Amendment-Fiss 
argues that the First Amendment should be "embracing of ... regula-
tion ... [that] seeks to further the democratic values that underlie the 
First Amendment itself. "11 Fiss regards the traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence as today little more than an anachronistic shell emptied 
of the meaning heretofore held, and, most importantly, as an impedi-
6 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28 (1979) [hereinafter MEIKLE-
JOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM]. 
7 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 954. 
8 See FISS, IRONY, supra note 1; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY]. 
9 See Frss, IRONY, supra note 1; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8. 
IO Frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 5. 
11 /d. at 19. 
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ment to the continuing development of democracy. 12 He calls for a 
remaking of free speech law, away from the exclusive fixation on 
keeping the state out of the free speech arena and toward embracing 
the state as the friend of free speech values. 13 Similarly, in his book, 
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, Sunstein calls for a rethinking 
of the First Amendment along the lines of "Madisonian" democratic 
values. 14 
The "New Deal for speech" that Sunstein advocates15 is closely re-
lated to the Fissian First Amendment revolution. Both Sunstein and 
Fiss conceive of the right to free speech as allowing, even demanding, 
broad state regulation in furtherance of the values underlying the right 
to free speech. 16 Both are prepared to give up the centerpiece of the 
American free speech culture, namely, categorical restriction of the 
state when it comes to speech matters. Instead, Sunstein and Fiss would 
encourage the state to regulate speech in order to help society achieve 
robust and diverse public debate on issues of societal importance and 
hence boost what they consider to be the central value underlying the 
First Amendment: collective democratic self-determination.17 Their ar-
guments are reflected in the recent First Amendment jurisprudence 
of U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Stephen Breyer. Justice Breyer's concur-
rence in the Supreme Court's second Turner Broadcasting decision, 
while not directly citing to their writings, is an important judicial 
endorsement of Sunstein's and Fiss's ideas. 18 
The revolutionary doctrinal visions put forth by Fiss and Sunstein 
have been realized. Not in the United States, to be sure, but in a 
European country. German constitutional law has for decades adhered 
12 This assumption underlies and motivates Fiss's entire argument. It is specifically set forth in 
Chapter 1 of Fxss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 5-26. 
13 See, e.g., id. at 19, 83. 
14 SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at xix, 17-51 (explaining his proposed ''New Deal for 
Speech"). 
15 See id. at 17-51. 
16 See Fxss, IRONY, supra note 1; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8. 
17 Fxss, IRONY, supra note 1; SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8. This article focuses primarily 
on the theoretical premises and doctrinal consequences of developing a new First Amendment 
approach based on a pursuit of certain values, using the regulation of broadcast as its central 
example. It does not deal with the First Amendment implications of restricting pornography and 
hate speech. For a brilliant argument on why such restrictions, as recently demanded by some 
on "the American political left," are essentially intellectually incoherent, see Amy Adler, What's 
Left?: Hate speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1499, 
1500 and passim (1996). 
18 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1203-05 (1997) [hereinafter 
Turner Il]. 
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to a free speech regime where the state must act as the guarantor of 
those values and interests that the constitutional provision protecting 
free speech is supposed to achieve. It is particularly with respect to the 
non-print mass media that the idea of the state as a "friend of speech"19 
has been embraced. The German Constitutional Court20 has developed 
a detailed and sophisticated constitutional framework for broadcast 
regulation. In order to evaluate properly the claims set forth by think-
ers such as Fiss and Sunstein, it is important to study the German sys-
tem. The Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on the issue of speech 
regulation is entitled to special attention not only because it has deter-
mined and shaped the media landscape of an entire nation, but be-
cause Germany is a country with a respectably functional democracy 
and with a recent history that would seem to force upon any respon-
sible German decisionmaker a heightened awareness of the dangers 
associated with the state's curtailing or manipulating the freedom of 
expression. 
The free speech rules pertaining to the press and the electronic mass 
media in Germany and the United States are roughly analogous. In 
both countries the press is basically free from state interference. There 
is no licensing of the press, no censorship, and no state involvement 
in the editorial process. The press is privately owned. In both countries, 
constitutional doctrine is based on the assumption that this laissez-faire 
approach to freedom of the press is constitutive of the proper func-
tioning of the press and indispensable to democratic self-determina-
tion. On the other hand, the non-print mass media in both countries 
are subject to levels of state intrusion and regulation that would be 
unconstitutional if applied to the printed press. The constitutional 
jurisprudence of both countries has generally upheld and validated a 
bifurcated system in which the press is largely free from government 
19fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 83. 
20 See generally KLAus SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (1997). The Constitutional 
Court is the highest court in Germany. It deals, as its name suggests, exclusively with questions 
of constitutional law. The staffing of the Constitutional Court is unlike that of any other court in 
the German system. Ordinarily, being a judge in Germany is a career path chosen upon full 
admission to the bar. The young lawyer starts in small claims court and, by seniority and quality 
of performance (determined by evaluations of the judge's written opinions by superior judges), 
can rise to higher and higher courts. All German judges, except for those sitting on the Consti-
tutional Court, are products of this judicial bureaucracy. The judges on the Constitutional Court, 
in contrast, are nominated to the Court by parliamentary committees. The process is politicized, 
if perhaps not as visibly so as in the United States. Any lawyer can be nominated: judges, 
practitioners, academics, politicians, etc. Id. 
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regulation while the broadcast media are generally subject to regula-
tion.21 
Aside from these broad similarities, there are important differences 
between the two countries' approaches to all mass media. The pre-
sumptions against government involvement are weaker in German 
mass media law. The German Constitutional Court has never adopted 
the rationale of the New York Times v. Sullivan decision. 22 Instead, the 
Constitutional Court has consistently affirmed the imposition of strin-
gent truth and factual correctness standards on newspaper reporting, 
standards that Justice Brennan's opinion forcefully dismissed. 23 More 
importantly, though, the Constitutional Court has interpreted the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of broadcast to mean something 
rather different from the textually adjacent freedom of the press. 24 
Since 1961, the time of its first decision concerning free speech in the 
21 For a concise summary of the differential treatment of press and broadcast in the U.S., see 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 637-41 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]. 
The analogous rule in German law is set forth in, for example, 12 Eutscheidungen des Bundes-
verfassungsgerichts (decisions of the Constitutional Court) (BVerfGE) 205,260-63 (1961). In the 
United States, cable television and the Internet have been explicitly exempted from the "special 
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media .... " Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343 (holding that 
strict First Amendment scrutiny applies to regulation of the Internet). See also Turner I, 512 U.S. 
at 637-40 (holding that the scarcity rationale that supports regulation of traditional broadcast 
does not apply to cable television). In Germany, in contrast, cable television is treated the same 
for constitutional purposes as traditional broadcast. See, e.g., 90 BVerfGE 60 (1994). 
22 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
23 See id. In New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan wrote: 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual 
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads 
to ... "selkensorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving 
it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred ... The 
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
Id. at 279-80. Contrast this with the "duty of truth" jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court. Roman Herzog summarizes the German position in the following way: 
Relating false news is covered by Article 5.1 Sentence 2 [freedom of the press) only if 
the mistake that led to the incorrect statement was made due to minor negligence. This 
level of tolerance is to be regarded as sufficient. 
Roman Herzog, Kommentar ZU Artikel 5, in KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ 53 (Dr. Theodor 
Maunz et al. eds., 1996) (emphasis added). The author is responsible for all translations of 
German passages in this article. 
24 See infra note 32 and accompanying text, for a complete citation of Article 5, the free speech 
clause of the German Basic Law. 
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broadcast area, until the present, the Constitutional Court has never 
wavered in its conviction that the freedom of broadcast is a freedom 
not primarily for the broadcasters themselves. Rather, the Constitu-
tional Court has viewed the freedom of broadcast as a freedom in 
service of the people, of their process of opinion formation, and thus 
in service of democracy. 25 The Constitutional Court has concluded that 
the basic values protected by the freedom of broadcast clause consti-
tutionally necessitate legislative action.26 While in the United States, 
regulation of broadcast is only permitted, but not required, under the 
First Amendment, the German Constitutional Court has expressly re-
quired the legislatures to pass laws that are supposed to guarantee 
objectivity of information, diversity of viewpoint, furtherance of demo-
cratic values, and a certain measure of "quality. "27 
Germany and the United States thus share the idea that broadcasters 
can be subjected to a level of state regulation incommensurate with 
the freedom of the traditional press. 28 The difference between the 
constitutional systems of the two countries is that, unlike the First 
Amendment as traditionally understood, the Basic Law,29 as interpreted 
by the Constitutional Court, commands legislatures to pass detailed laws 
and regulations that must ensure that broadcast conforms with what 
amounts to catalogues of democratic values drafted by the legislatures 
and subject to judicial scrutiny.30 
In this article, I examine the arguments that these supporters of 
speech regulation have put forth. I conclude that the arguments made 
by the German Constitutional Court as well as by Sunstein and Fiss are 
closely related and suffer from similar and severe weaknesses. These 
arguments do not support the claim that regulation is necessary, or 
preferable to a laissez-faire regime as it is found in the press area. While 
there are problems and risks associated with an unregulated media 
market populated by large and powerful participants, these risks may 
be largely containable and controllable by an intelligent application of 
25 See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE 295, 320 (1981). 
26Jd. 
27 See Turner/, 512 U.S. at 637-38; 57 BVerfGE at 320 (for furtherance of democratic values); 
73 BVerfGE 118, 155-56 (1986) (for quality concerns). 
28 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). In Red Lion, the Supreme 
Court stated that "[it] is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not 
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." /d. The German conception of 
broadcasters as public trustees is set forth in 31 BVerfGE 314, 329 (1971). 
29 The Basic Law ("Grundgesetz," abbreviated "GG") is the name of the German Constitution. 
so See infra Part II(B) (2). 
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existing First Amendment doctrine. A fundamental rethinking of the 
First Amendment in the direction of mandating or liberally permitting 
regulation, suggested by American pro-regulation scholars and epito-
mized by the freedom of broadcast jurisprudence of the German 
Constitutional Court, is unsupported by the arguments advanced in its 
favor, unnecessary, and might well be damaging to the very values it 
seeks to promote. In short, neither the theories of Fiss and Sunstein 
nor the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court have been 
able to develop a set of rationales that would convincingly support state 
action as a means to realize and guarantee the values of free speech. 
Moreover, they have not developed a set of structures that would 
promise to contain the risks of state involvement in this area. Were the 
U.S. Supreme Court to adopt Germany's broadcast regime as a model 
for a new First Amendment, it would take an unfortunate step toward 
destabilizing a constitutional system that has largely managed to avoid 
the temptation to systematize its underlying values, that has remained 
resilient because it has remained philosophically "messy. "31 
II. FREEDOM OF BROADCAST IN GERMANY 
A. Article 5 Within the Basic Law's Objective Hierarchy of Values 
Article 5 of the German Basic Law states: 
( 1) Each person has the right freely to express and dissemi-
nate his opinion in word, writing, and picture, and to obtain 
information from generally accessible sources without inter-
ference. The freedom of the press and the freedom to re-
port information through broadcast and film are guaranteed. 
There shall be no censorship. 
(2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general 
laws, the laws for the protection of minors, and the law of 
personal honor. 
31 The term is Martha Nussbaum's, who is committed to a conception of human deliberation 
that is "mundane, messy, and lacking in elegance" because it deliberately sacrifices (Platonic) 
theoretical elegance and simplicity for the sake of (Aristotelian) "practical wisdom." MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, THE fRAGILITY OF GoODNESS-LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSo-
PHY 372 (1986). Sunstein's recent post-Madisonian conceptualization of American constitutional 
law in terms of "incompletely theorized agreements" seems to me closely related to Nussbaum's 
Aristotelianism. See infra notes 259, 333, and 361. 
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(3) Art, science, research, and teaching are free. Freedom of 
teaching does not absolve from fidelity to the constitution.32 
83 
In its 1981 opinion on the freedom of broadcast, the Constitutional 
Court provided a detailed explanation of its approach to Article 5.1, 
which contains the freedom of broadcast provision. 33 According to 
the Court's conception of constitutional law, particular constitutional 
clauses are embedded in a larger system of interrelated norms. The 
following passage exemplifies this approach: 
Article 5.1 Sentence 2 of the Basic Law demands legislation 
regulating private broadcasting.34 Such legislation must pro-
vide the conditions necessary to guarantee the freedom of 
broadcast. In order to become effective, the freedom of 
broadcast that is constitutionally guaranteed by Article 5.1 
Sentence 2 of the Basic Law must be legislatively substanti-
ated. This necessity results from the purpose and the special 
character of the constitutional guarantee at issue. The free-
dom of broadcast serves the same purpose as all guarantees 
of Article 5.1 of the Basic Law: to ensure the formation of 
free individual and public opinion in a comprehensive way 
that includes every transmission of information and opinion 
and is not limited to the mere reporting of news or to the 
transmission of political opinions. . . . A free formation of 
opinion takes place in a process of communication. It is 
predicated on the one hand on the freedom to express and 
disseminate opinions, and on the other hand on the freedom 
to take notice of expressed opinions and to inform oneself. 
By guaranteeing as human rights the freedoms to express 
opinions, to disseminate opinions, i.e., to inform oneself, 
Article 5.1 of the Basic Law seeks at the same time to protect 
this process constitutionally. In this respect, Article 5.1 grants 
subjective rights; in connection therewith it normatively es-
tablishes the freedom of opinion as an objective principle of 
the entire legal order, whereby the elements of subjective and 
objective rights condition and support one another .... 35 
32 Art. 5 GG. 
3357 BVerfGE 295 (1981). 
34 The provision reads: 'The freedom of the press and the freedom to report information 
through broadcast and film are guaranteed." Art. 5.1 sent. 2 GG. 
35 57 BVerfGE at 319-20. 
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What is the nature of this constitutional system which places such a 
premium on the interdependence of particular constitutional provi-
sions? How does this organic, almost holistic, approach affect concrete 
constitutional rights? 
In the German system, all fundamental rights (contained in the first 
19 Articles of the Basic Law) are viewed as connected with and depend-
ent upon each other.36 They are not equal, but rather hierarchically 
organized, with Article 1 at the pinnacle.37 
The Constitutional Court firmly established this systematic and hier-
archical nature of the Basic Law early in its history. In the Lilth opin-
ion,38 the Court faced the constitutional complaint of Mr. Erich Liith, 
a prominent member of the press who had called for a boycott of a 
new movie directed by Veit Harlan, the director of the infamous Nazi 
propaganda film 'jud Siiss."39 Harlan had been successful in obtaining 
an injunction against Liith in state court that prevented Liith from 
repeating his call for a boycott.40 The Constitutional Court overturned 
the injunction, holding that Liith's Article 5 interest outweighed Har-
lan's economic interest in not being boycottedY In the course of its 
opinion, the Court explained that all of German law is pyramidally 
36See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE I98, 20~5 (I958). 
37 Id. Article I of the Basic Law reads as follows: 
(I) The dignity of the human being is inviolable. It is the duty of all state power to 
respect and protect it. 
(2) The German People therefore acknowledge and accept the existence of inviolable 
and inalienable human rights that are the foundation of every human society, of peace, 
and of justice in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as 
immediately effective law. 
Art. I GG. A prominent treatise on the Basic Law describes the motivations behind Article I as 
follows: 
Article I is a direct reaction to crimes against humanity committed by the National 
Socialists. Its position as the most prominent and the foundational statement of the Basic 
Law results from the desire of the drafters of the Basic Law to reverse forever the 
National Socialist idea that the state, or the community, is everything and the individual 
nothing. Accordingly, the dignity of the (individual) human being is the highest value 
of the Basic Law (32 BVerfGE 98, 108). Goals of the state have no value of their own; 
they derive their justification solely from the fact that they concretely serve human 
beings. 
HANS D.jARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR 27-28 (1992). 
38 See 7 BVerfGE 198. 
39 See id. at 200. 
40 See id. at 201--02. 
41 See id. at 240. 
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arranged, with Article 1 of the Basic Law at the top, the other basic 
human rights immediately under it, and so on.42 Therefore, every 
statute has to be interpreted so as not to infringe on constitutional 
rights.43 The judge in the court below had interpreted the particular 
statute on which the injunction against Liith was based in such a way 
as to make it infringe on Liith's right to express his opinion, thus 
applying the law unconstitutionally.44 
Lilth remains a pillar of the German constitutional order; it defines 
the basic structure of German constitutional jurisprudence. The Con-
stitutional Court rejected the notion that the Basic Law is a value-neu-
tral order.45 Instead, the Basic Law expresses a positive commitment to 
an "objective hierarchy of values" predominantly contained in the 
basic-rights section (Articles 1-19 of the Basic Law) and fundamentally 
informed by Article 1 's concept of human dignity: 
Without any doubt, the basic rights are primarily designed to 
protect the sphere of freedom of the individual from intru-
sions of public power; they are defensive rights of the citizen 
against the state .... It is just as true, however, that the Basic 
Law does not want to be a value-neutral order. In its section on 
basic rights, the Basic Law has also erected an objective hierarchy 
of values. Particularly therein lies a fundamental strengthen-
42 See id. at 204-05. 
43 See 7 BVerfGE at 208-09. 
44 See id. at 222-30. The Constitutional Court recently explained the relation of the right to 
free speech to "general laws," such as the one applied against Mr. Liith, as follows: 
Neither the freedom of the press nor the freedom of broadcast are granted without 
limitations. According to Article 5.2 of the Basic Law, they are limited by the general 
laws, i.e., all laws that are not directed specifically against the media or against a specific 
opinion, but that simply serve to protect another legal right irrespective of particular 
information or opinions, as long as that legal right is not inferior to the constitutional 
protection of the media .... This does not mean, however, that Article 5.2 of the Basic 
Law permits arbitrary infringements of the freedom of the media if those infringements 
are based on a general law. Rather, the Basic Law demands that laws which limit 
constitutional rights are interpreted and applied in light of the infringed constitutional 
right so that the value-determinative significance of the constitutional right is properly 
reflected at the level of applying the general law .... Generally preferring the legal 
right in whose name the constitutional right is being infringed would not be in accord-
ance with this approach. Rather, the value of he infringed constitutional right and the 
value served by the infringing general law must be balanced. 
91 BVerfGE 125, 135-36 (1994) (citations omitted). For an excellent explanation of these 
decidedly confusing issues, see Peter E. Quindt, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitu-
tional Theory, 48 Mn. L. REv. 247 (1989). 
45 See 7 BVerfGE at 204-05. 
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ing of the validity and force of the basic rights. . . This 
system of values is centered on the human personality that 
freely develops within the social community, and on the dig-
nity of that personality. The system of values must be viewed 
as a fundamental constitutional decision for all aspects of law; 
legislation, administration, and adjudication receive guide-
lines and impulses from this system. In this way, the Basic 
Law's objective hierarchy of values obviously also influences 
civil law; no provision of civil law may contradict the value 
hierarchy; each provision must be interpreted according to 
its spirit.46 
Hierarchical arrangement of constitutional rights and commitment of 
the entire legal order to a central value, such as human dignity, have 
interesting and often disturbing consequences. They create a certain 
fluidity of the system, a reactiveness and sensitivity of fundamental 
constitutional rights to each other that sometimes makes even seem-
ingly absolute guarantees surprisingly infringible. Absolutism with re-
spect to specific constitutional rights is not a virtue practiced by the 
Constitutional Court; balancing of the various rights and values in-
volved in a legal conflict is the Court's preferred methodology. 
In its Mephisto opinion of 1971, the Constitutional Court demon-
strated these shortcomings in striking fashion.47 The Court held that 
freedom of art, expressly granted in Article 5.3, may have to yield to 
human dignity concerns despite the fact that the rights protected by 
Article 5.3 are formulated in an absolute fashion. 48 The Court affirmed 
a lower court's prohibition of the publication of Klaus Mann's novel 
Mephisto. 49 In the novel, Mann portrays the actor Gustaf Griindgens as 
the "abject type of the treacherous intellectual who prostitutes his 
talent for the sake of some tawdry fame and transitory wealth" during 
the Third Reich.50 Griindgens's stepson sued the publisher of the 
novel, reasoning that the portrayal violated his (deceased) father's 
human dignity which is protected by Article 1 of the Basic Law. 5 1 
The Court upheld the ban of the Mephisto novel in Germany on the 
basis of that rationale. 52 Reasoning that freedom of art is not an autono-
46 Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
47See30BVerfGE 173 (1971). 
48 See id. at 193. 
49 See id. at 199-200. 
50 Id. at 175, quoting KLAus MANN, THE TuRNING POINT at 281-82 (1942). 
51 See id. at 176-81. 
52 See 30 BVerfGE at 195-96. 
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mous freedom but rather part of the constitutional value system and 
ultimately an emanation from Article 1 's guarantee of human dignity, 
the Court stated: 
[Freedom of art] is not granted without limitations. Like all 
basic rights, [freedom of art] is based on the Basic Law's 
image of the human being, i.e., based on the human being 
as an independent and responsible personality who freely 
unfolds within the social community .... [A] conflict that 
arises with respect to the freedom of art must be solved 
through constitutional interpretation according to the value 
order of the Basic Law and according to the unity of this 
fundamental value system. As part of the Basic Law's system 
of values, freedom of art is particularly associated with the 
dignity of the human being guaranteed in Art. 1, which as 
supreme value dominates the entire value system of the Basic 
Law .... Despite that [association], freedom of art can con-
flict with the similarly constitutionally protected [by Art. 1] 
personal sphere because a work of art can have consequences 
on a sociallevel.53 
Therefore, a balancing must be performed between the violation of 
the personal sphere of the plaintiff and the speech right of the defen-
dant. 54 The Court held that the lower court had correctly performed 
this balancing act; the lower court's holding that the dignity interest 
of Mr. Griindgens, the deceased, outweighed the interest protected by 
the freedom of art had to be affirmed. 55 
Conceiving of the right to free speech as primarily an instrument 
for realizing certain values leads inevitably to a destabilization of the 
right. This approach deemphasizes an examination of how best to 
achieve a guaranteed freedom in the real world, and instead necessi-
tates considerations of a much more abstract nature-weighing and 
balancing interests, uncovering ultimate values, systematizing those 
values and prioritizing among them. Consequently, a systematic analy-
sis of basic principles becomes primary while issues concerning how 
best to protect and support the constitutional right, whatever its theory, 
recede into the background. In fact, in a value system such as the 
German one, questions about rights qua rights, that is, irrespective of 
53Jd. at 193 (citations omitted). 
54 /d. at 195-96. 
55 See id. at 195-99. 
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their theoretical justifications or underpinnings, are quite meaning-
less. In the Mephisto case, for example, freedom of art loses because its 
meaning, force, and validity depend on, and in this case conflict with, 
its own philosophical underpinning-human dignity.56 
The connection between legal doctrine on the one hand and the 
values underlying that doctrine on the other is attenuated, not imme-
diate. Careful arguments are needed to translate theoretical insights 
into a practical rule. The Constitutional Court's free speech jurispru-
dence is an example of judicial reasoning that almost completely dis-
penses with an explanation of the link between constitutional theory 
and concrete prescriptions in the service of that theory. Consider the 
Mephisto case. From a real-world perspective, its outcome is difficult to 
justifY. The Court outlawed a work ofliterature that, without any doubt, 
constitutes an important contribution to a political and social debate 
of substantial relevance to German society.57 The Mephisto novel ana-
lyzes a type of political opportunist, the one who has no political 
commitments or who suppresses them for the sake of career and 
comfort of conscience. 58 By artistically working through the psychology 
of such a human being, Mann raised issues that urgently needed to be 
addressed in post-war Germany. The Court missed all that, and it did 
so precisely by embedding the freedom of art in the hierarchical value 
matrix of the Basic Law. By doing so, it destroyed the freedom. The free-
dom may have been formulated as an absolute, but it is now open to 
simply being balanced away by weighing its value against the value of 
a competing or "superior" constitutional right. This is more than an 
infringement at the margins of a constitutional right. This is vulner-
ability at the core. Responsible for that vulnerability is the shifting of 
the debate onto the level of value, of abstract concept, instead of 
keeping the debate firmly grounded in concrete facts and legal cate-
gories. Value debate allowed the Mephisto Court to permit an arguably 
minuscule interest, the reputational interest of a dead Nazi actor, to 
win out against major ones, such as the right of a national audience to 
receive works of artistic and social relevance and the right of authors 
and publishers to be free from state censorship, without so much as 
evincing a glimmer of insight that the ruling might be problematic. 59 
56 See id. at 193-95. 
57 For a discussion of the novel's political relevance, see id. at 200-27 (dissents by Justices Dr. 
Stein and Rupp-v. Briinneck). 
58 See id. at 212-14. 
59 See generally id. at 174-200 (majority opinion). 
1998] NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 89 
Such is the seductive power, and the rhetorical utility, of the value 
focus. 
B. The Roots and Development of the Freedom of Broadcast Doctrine 
1. The Television Opinion of 1961 
When the Constitutional Court, in 1961, was confronted for the first 
time with constitutional questions concerning the structure of German 
broadcast, 60 specifically television, there existed only one television 
channel in the country.61 This channel, called "ARD" (Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland-association of the public broadcast stations of the 
Federal Republic of Germany), was the result of a cooperation of the 
nine public broadcast stations then in existence in Germany. 62 These 
public broadcast stations were organized under state law. 63 Some of 
these stations issued from one state only, while others involved the 
cooperation of several states on the basis of specific broadcast agree-
ments among them.64 In 1960, the federal government decided to 
organize this second channel as a limited liability company (GmbH) 
owned by the federal government.65 Several states sued, citing various 
violations of their sovereignty and, in addition, a violation of Article 
5.66 They won on both counts.67 
While most of the opinion discussed questions concerning the dis-
tribution of competency between the states and the federal govern-
ment, there is a brief section at the end that addresses issues arising 
under Article 5.68 This section proved defining for the Court's future 
approach to Germany's broadcast system. The Court held that public 
monopoly broadcasting as it existed in Germany at the time was con-
stitutionally acceptable.69 While, in 1998, the public monopoly over 
television has been broken for over a decade, making certain parts 
of the 1961 opinion obsolete, the Court's basic approach has never 
60 See 12 BVerfGE 205. 
6! See id. at 212. 
62 See id. at 211-12. 
63 See id. at 211. 
64 See id. 
65 See 12 BVerfGE at 215. 
66 See id. at 216-18. 
67 See id. at 207. 
68 See id. at 259-64. 
69 /d. at 262. 
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changed. Legislative control over broadcast is still seen as constitu-
tionai.70 In fact, that control has increased over time. Under the 1961 
opinion, regulation of broadcast was only constitutionally permitted; 
from the 1970s onward, it was constitutionally demanded.71 
The relevant part of the 1961 opinion72 started out, ironically, by 
affirming the Court's commitment to a free, private and unlicensed 
press, as well as the equal importance of broadcast as a means of mass 
communication and as a contributor to the formation of public opin-
ion. 73 The Court thus chose, at this early stage of doctrinal develop-
ment, not to distinguish press and broadcast by some inherent differ-
ential of journalistic quality.74 It could have claimed that broadcast is a 
medium of mere entertainment value, not to be taken seriously as a 
means of enriching public debate or informing the populace. Instead, 
the Court did the contrary. It insisted on broadcast's equal significance, 
and it granted broadcast the full protection of Article 5.75 
Given the reality of single-channel public television in the Germany 
of the early 1960s, however, the Court was forced to accommodate 
doctrinally the disparate press and broadcast systems. It did so by 
accepting the empirical assumption that many independent, privately 
owned newspapers of diverse political orientations existed in Germany, 
and that they provided a broad spectrum ofviewpoints.76 With respect 
to broadcast, the situation at the time was different. Only one television 
channel existed for the w:hole nation, and only one more was likely to 
appear in the foreseeable future. Organization of these programs was 
by state or federal law; purely private broadcast stations were nonex-
istent.77 The Court recognized and accommodated this reality. While 
the Court touched tersely on two other scarcity rationales-economic 
and spectrum scarcity-to justify treating broadcast differently from 
70 See, e.g., 83 BVerfGE 238, 295-98 (1991). 
71 See id.; see also 31 BVerfGE at 325. 
72 See 12 BVerfGE at 259-64. 
73 Id. at 260. 
74 See id. at 260-61. 
75Jd. 
76 Id. at 259-61. 
77 The Court recited the post-war history of broadcast in Germany in the following way: 
Mter World War II, German entities were prohibited from running broadcast stations. 
The stations were confiscated and run by the Allies, who gradually gave broadcast back 
into German hands. The Western Allies aimed at eliminating any state influence over 
broadcast. In the three Western zones of occupation, the military governments or the 
state governments (which were heavily influenced by the occupying powers) passed laws 
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the press/8 it is palpable from the opinion that the Court's ruling is 
based primarily on the reality of the German television system in 
196J.79 
It is to be noted that, at this early stage of its treatment of the 
broadcast issue, the Court used permissive, rather than mandatory, 
language. Under the Basic Law, it was permissible, and permissible 
only, to address the problems arising out of the scarcity of broadcast 
providers by establishing a public broadcast monopoly, as long as 
certain standards of freedom from state intervention into the editorial 
process were guaranteed.80 In addition, an appropriate diversity of 
viewpoints had to be given voice within a single television station.81 This 
was a reasonable strategy since no external sources of diversity (i.e., 
multiple stations) were available. In the realm of the press, in contrast, 
diversity of viewpoints was maintained by virtue of the actual existence 
of many newspapers with different political and social outlooks.82 The 
overall mix presumptively yields an array of opinions representative of 
the nation as a whole. 83 
Thus, by 1961, the Court had constitutionally recognized two oppo-
site mass media realities, and had thereby set the stage for the devel-
opment of the two constitutional paradigms of broadcast. The "inter-
nally pluralistic model" of broadcast is based on structuring an 
extremely limited number of television stations in such a way as to 
creating public broadcast stations. These broadcast stations were given the right to 
manage themselves. Some of them were kept under strict legal supervision. The basic 
tenets of programming, as well as the rules concerning tasks, organization, and eco-
nomic structure of these stations were aimed at securing their independence from the 
state and their political neutrality. The same is true for the broadcast stations which were 
created later, and without influence of the Allies, by laws or treaties among the states. 
12 BVerfGE at 210. 
78 The Court wrote: 
... in the realm of broadcast the number of offerors of programs must remain relatively 
small because of technical reasons as well as the unusually high costs associated with 
broadcasting. This special situation in the realm of broadcast requires specific accom-
modations for the realization and maintenance of the freedom of broadcast guaranteed 
in Article 5 of the Basic Law. 
/d. at 261. 
79 /d. at 261-62. 
80 /d. at 262 (stating that a broadcast monopoly does not conflict with Article 5 given the 
technical realities of broadcast, but emphasizing that Article 5 does not demand such a monopoly). 
81 /d. at 262-63. 
8212 BVerfGE at 261. 
8~ /d. 
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avoid dominance by a single social or political group and to achieve a 
fair representation of the diversity of viewpoints held by the people at 
large.84 The opposite model, the "externally pluralistic model," para-
digmatically embodied by t~e press, depends on the existence of a 
large number of media speakers to ensure proper balance and diversity 
of opinions. 85 
In 1961, the Court did not view the state monopoly model as a 
structure mandated by the Basic Law, but rather as one possible re-
sponse to the special nature of the contemporary structure of broad-
cast.86 The Constitutional Court did not contemplate the possibility of 
broadcasting by a large number of private stations, such as that which 
exists in the United States and Germany today. This excusable failure 
of imagination may have contributed to the Constitutional Court's use 
of language that, read out of the historical context described above, 
seems to suggest that diversity in broadcasting is achievable only 
through legislative action, be it geared toward public or private televi-
sion stations. The Constitutional Court stated: 
At any rate, Article 5 of the Basic Law demands that this 
modern instrument of forming opinions not be handed over 
to the state or one single social group. Broadcast stations 
must, therefore, be organized in such a fashion as to enable 
all relevant forces to have an influence over the stations and 
to be heard in the overall programming. For the content of the 
overall programming, binding guiding principles must be estab-
lished in order to guarantee a minimum balance of content, ra-
tionality, and mutual respect. This can only be guaranteed 
when such organizational and substantive guiding principles 
are made generally binding through laws. Article 5 of the 
Basic Law therefore demands passage of such laws.87 
The Constitutional Court probably found it unnecessary to reiterate 
that its call for binding principles applied to the concrete conditions 
of Germany at the time (i.e., no diversity of broadcast outlets). Without 
this empirical premise, however, the opinion sounds as if the freedom 
84Herzog, supra note 23, at 76a-77. 
85Jd. 
86 12 BVerfGE at 262. "(l]t is by no means true that Article 5 of the Basic Law necessitates the 
creation of such a monopoly in the country." I d. 
87 Id. at 262-63 (emphasis added). 
1998) NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 93 
of broadcast demanded legislation irrespective of the specific realities 
of broadcasting in 1961. 
Thus, the first broadcast opinion is one that can easily be misunder-
stood. On the one hand, the Court found that the Basic Law tolerated, 
but did not demand, the public monopoly; the possibility of private 
broadcasting was explicitly given constitutional sanction. 88 More impor-
tantly, the Court found freedom of the press and freedom of broadcast 
to be inherently equivalent, serving the same purpose and protecting 
the same interests.89 The fact that the reality of broadcasting in con-
temporary Germany was vastly different from that of the press in the 
early 1960s, however, made it permissible to rely on the state for 
achieving the constitutional purpose. 
On the other hand, the Court used language that in subsequent 
decisions allowed the demand for legislative action to be pushed be-
yond merely a solution to a specific problem.90 A historically contingent 
demand for legislative action would later be transformed into an in-
herent characteristic of the freedom of broadcast.91 The duty to legis-
late and the duty of state intervention, captured in the expression 
"serving freedom,"92 was to become a constitutionally entrenched prin-
ciple.93 
2. The Entrenchment of the Duty to Legislate 
Ten years passed before the Constitutional Court again encountered 
the broadcast issue. The issue facing the Court in 1971 was the consti-
tutionality of a new tax law.94 This law declared that the activities of 
broadcast stations were commercial or professional in nature, thus 
subjecting these stations to taxation.95 The Court held that broadcast 
stations-both radio and television-are public trustees, fulfilling a 
public function and providing an integrating role for the whole na-
tion.96 Therefore, the Court concluded that their activities could not 
88 See id. at 262. 
89 See id. at 260-61. 
90 !d. at 262-63. 
91 See, e.g., 31 BVerfGE at 325. 
92 See, e.g., 83 BVerfGE at 295. 
93 !d. 
94 31 BVerfGE at 315. 
95 !d. 
96 !d. at 329. 
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be characterized as commercial or professional, and the stations could 
not be taxed.97 
In holding that broadcast performs a public service, the Court 
moved beyond the permissive and flexible approach of the 1961 deci-
sion.98While in the earlier decision, the differential treatment of broad-
cast and press was recognizably a reaction to the different realities of 
the two media, this empirically based differentiation receded into the 
background in the later decision.99 
The Court mentioned three rationales that justified a special treat-
ment for broadcast. These three rationales were: (1) the potentially 
dangerous power and influence of broadcast; (2) spectrum scarcity; 
and (3) economic scarcity.100 Rationales two and three are lifted directly 
from the 1961 opinion; the Court does not elaborate on them any fur-
ther.101 The first rationale, concerning the dangerous power of broad-
cast, had not appeared in the earlier decision. The Court used this 
argument aggressively for the purpose of foreclosing any constitutional 
presumption in favor of a laissez-faire regime of broadcast, holding that 
such a regime would be unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court stated: 
Not least due to the developments of television technology, 
broadcast has become one of the most powerful means of 
communication, as well as one of the most powerful mass 
media. Because of its far-reaching effects and potentials, as 
well as because of the danger of misuse for the purpose of 
exercising one-sided influence over public opinion, broadcast 
cannot be given over to the free play of forces. 102 
The second broadcast opinion combined its demand for legislative 
structure with the public trustee model of the broadcast stations.103 It 
viewed the public broadcast stations as delegates of the states that 
fulfilled a constitutionally mandated public service.104 As a result, the 
states were now faced with the challenge of drafting specific laws that 
would guarantee representative diversity and pluralism in program-
97 Id. at 329-30. 
98 See 12 BVerfGe at 262. 
99 See 12 BVerfGE at 262; 31 BVerfGE at 325-26. 
100 See 31 BVerfGE at 325-26. 
101 See id. at 326. 
102 /d. (emphasis added). 
103 See id. at 329. 
104 See 31 BVerfGE at 329. There were still no private stations at the time of the Constitutional 
Court's 1971 decision. See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 296-303. 
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ming, 105 while not violating the state involvement prohibition of Article 
5.106 
In 1981, the Court addressed broadcast issues for the third time in its 
history. 107 In that decision, the Constitutional Court held that private 
broadcasting was in principle constitutional and thus opened the door 
for a subsequent expansion of private, commercially financed tele-
vision.108 The constitutional concepts that the Court had previously 
forged in response to the public monopoly situation that existed 
through the 1970s now forcefully asserted themselves in the new era 
of rapid technological developments. Given that broadcasting was 
promising to become more diverse, by virtue of increasing numbers of 
private broadcasters and decreasing technological limitations on the 
number of available channels, a plausible response for the Court might 
have been gradually to shift the conceptualization of freedom ofbroad-
cast towards that of the press. Emphatically, this was not the course that 
105 See 31 BVerfGE at 329. 
!06 Id. The constitutional prohibition against state involvement is a difficult doctrine, given that 
the Court mandates state regulation of broadcast. On the one hand, the doctrine seems to have 
some bite. For example, in its first television opinion, the Court struck down federal laws 
organizing a new public broadcasting company because it would have been "completely in the 
hands of the state" and "an instrument of the federal government." 12 BVerfGE at 263. On the 
other hand, the state is under a constitutional mandate to regulate broadcast. Id. at 262-63; see 
also 31 BVerfGE at 329. Herzog attempted to accommodate the two opposed principles of 
mandated broadcast legislation and freedom from state interference in the following way: 
What is essential is the freedom of the mass media from influences by parliaments and 
governments, but not the currently prevalent legal structure of the public broadcast 
corporation. Put differently, the independence from the state is the crucial criterion, 
not the closeness of the relationship between the state and the broadcast stations. In 
other words, a broadcast station that is legally part of the state's administrative apparatus 
would be in accord with the intention of Article 5.2 as long as clear regulations enabled 
it to operate independent of directives issued by the state. 
Herzog, supra note 23, at 72a. This distinction is less robust than Herzog seems to assume. Take 
the following passage from 83 BVerfGE at 326-27. Mter emphasizing the prohibition against state 
involvement, the Court held that the legislature may "select the social forces or groups who may 
participate in" private broadcasting, organized according to the internally pluralistic model. The 
Court continued: "It is constitutionally acceptable for the legislature to draw up a catalogue of 
locally relevant social forces and groups, as long as this selection is appropriate for guaranteeing 
balance and diversity." ld. But legislative regulation of diversity in broadcast does make broadcast 
"an instrument of the ... government" (12 BVerfGE at 263) by any intelligible standard. 
107 See 57 BVerfGE 295. 
lOS ld. at 326. The Court declined to address the question whether there is a constitutional right 
to private broadcasting stations, id. at 318--19, examining only whether a state law permitting and 
structuring such private stations passed constitutional muster. ld. The Court found the law to be 
unconstitutional because it did not provide for sufficiently stringent control of private broadcast-
ers. ld. at 326-35. 
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the Court chose. Instead, the Court irreversibly transformed the free-
dom of broadcast into a freedom explicitly and directly in the service 
of the values underlying Article 5.109 
Mter the 1981 decision, freedom of broadcast shared few similarities 
with the traditional freedom of the press, in terms of the right to be 
free from government regulation and intrusion. Freedom of broadcast 
became a subordinate interest in the service of a greater good, namely, 
helping the public to form opinions: 
[T] he freedom of broadcast is primarily a freedom . . . in 
service of the freedom of opinion formation. Under the condi-
tions of modern mass communication, the freedom ofbroad-
. cast constitutes a necessary supplementation and reinforce-
ment of the freedom of opinion formation; the freedom of 
broadcast serves the task of guaranteeing free and compre-
hensive opinion formation through broadcast. 110 
The Court thus dismissed the libertarian approach and held that the 
Basic Law required legislative supervision ofbroadcast.m Explaining the 
new doctrine, the Court briefly mentioned the classic interpretation of 
freedom of expression as a guarantee of freedom from state interfer-
ence, but then explained why this interpretation cannot be controlling 
for broadcast: 
The free individual and public formation of opinion by 
means of broadcast demands first that broadcast be free from 
domination and intrusion of the state. In this way, the free-
dom of broadcast, like the classical libertarian rights, is de-
fensive in its meaning. However, the value to be pursued is not 
yet guaranteed by freedom from state interference. Mere freedom 
from state interference does by itself not mean that free 
and comprehensive opinion formation through broadcast be-
comes possible; this task cannot be accomplished through a 
merely negative constitutional structure. Rather, what is need-
ed is a positive order that ensures that the multiplicity of exist-
ing opinions is expressed through broadcast in the greatest 
possible breadth and completeness, and that thereby com pre-
109 /d. at 320. The Court does not make a distinction, for purposes of its conception of the 
freedom of broadcast, between cable and non-<:able transmission of the broadcast signal. See, e.g., 
90 BVerfGE 60. 
uo 57 BVerfGE at 320. 
l1l See id. 
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hensive information is offered. In order to accomplish this, 
substantive, organizational and procedural regulations are 
necessary that are designed according to the task of the free-
dom of broadcast and are therefore able to accomplish that 
which Article 5.1 of the Basic Law is supposed to guarantee. 112 
97 
This passage sums up the Court's modern position on the issue of 
freedom of broadcast. Laissez-faire is decisively rejected, state regula-
tion is embraced. The result is a highly complex and surprisingly 
intrusive constitutional jurisprudence that necessitates an examination 
of the details of state legislation to ensure that every facet of the 
legislation does indeed serve public opinion formation. 
In the next broadcast opinion,113 its fourth overall, the Court pro-
vided a more elaborate articulation of the constitutionality of private 
broadcasting.114 While affirming the constitutional permissibility of pri-
vate broadcasting, 115 the Court held that, if a state legislature decides 
to allow private broadcasting, it must sufficiently regulate the private 
broadcasters: 
The legislature, however, is free to choose other structures as 
long as it guarantees through appropriate regulations that the 
totality of the domestic broadcast offerings in fact essentially 
corresponds to the existing diversity of opinions. If the legis-
lature wishes to create and maintain freedom of broadcast 
through external ("externally pluralistic") diversification, 
then even this solution does not make the need to secure the 
freedom through law and regulation superfluous. 116 
In order for the lack of internal regulation of private broadcasters to 
be constitutionally acceptable, the public broadcast stations must first 
guarantee a so-called "basic service" of broadcasting.117 Basic service 
entails the "classic task" of broadcast, consisting of its role in the 
formation of opinion and of political will, but also going beyond 
entertainment and reporting of current affairs to include the "cultural 
responsibility" ofbroadcast.118 Basic service is that type of programming 
112 /d. (emphasis added). 
m See 73 BVerfGE 118. 
114 See generally id. at 152-60. 
115 /d. at 157. 
116 /d. at 153. 
117 /d. at 157-59. 
118 73 BVerfGE at 158. 
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that the private stations cannot deliver due to their market orienta-
tion.119 
Once basic service is guaranteed, a legislature may relax its regula-
tion of private broadcasters.12° Relying, in a very limited fashion, on 
the diversification among stations to provide the requisite breadth and 
plurality of opinions constitutes somewhat of a departure from the 
Court's previous iron control over all of broadcast and the Court's 
insistence on an a priori guarantee, through legislation, of a constitu-
tionally acceptable end result. 121 The Court conceded that its ruling 
constituted somewhat of a departure from its earlier holdings concern-
ing the unacceptability of any imbalances in private broadcasting.122 
The Court acknowledged, however, that a perfectly balanced broadcast 
offering is neither achievable nor exactly definable. 123 Given this built-
in indeterminacy, minor and insignificant imbalances arising within 
private broadcasting are acceptable, as long as the overall legislative 
regime is designed constantly to optimize balance and pluralism.124 
Thus, a legislature opting for the externally pluralistic125 system must 
design a set of laws that allows the enforcement of a basic standard of 
evenly balanced pluralism.126 As the Court emphasized in a 1991 deci-
sion, Article 5 is violated if this standard is not satisfactorily provided: 
As a serving freedom, [the freedom of broadcast] is granted 
not primarily in the interest of broadcasters, but rather in the 
interest of free individual and public opinion formation. The 
legislature is, therefore, under a duty to structure the broad-
cast system in such a way as to guarantee that this goal is 
reached.127 
The Court continued: 
The Basic Law does not prescribe models for the structure of 
broadcast, but only a goal: the freedom of broadcast. Broad-
cast must be able to fulfill its task of serving free individual 
and public opinion formation. This task is independent of 
119 /d. at 155-56. 
126 /d. at 153, 158-59. 
121 /d. at 158-59. 
122 /d. at 159. 
123 See 73 BVerfGE at 159 (''Evenly balanced multiplicity of opinions cannot ... be understood 
as a measurable and exact standard"). 
124 See id. 
125 /d. at 153. 
126 /d. at 160. 
127 83 BVerfGE at 315. 
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any specific [organizational] model. Every form of broadcast 
organization that makes the accomplishment of this task pos-
sible is constitutional.128 
99 
The legislature may choose a broadcast model in which with the public 
stations provide basic service, while the private stations operate under 
a less stringent regulatory regime. 129 The legislature, however, is not 
obligated to do so. If it desires, the legislature can choose an internally 
pluralistic structure and regulate all relevant features of each private 
broadcaster. 130 
C. The Constitutional Court's Rationales for Different Treatment of 
Broadcast and Press 
How does the Constitutional Court justifY such a high level of man-
dated legislative intrusion into the broadcasting process? Do its ration-
ales make sense? 
As discussed above, in its earliest encounters with issues arising 
under the freedom of broadcast in 1961 and 1971, the Court dealt 
briefly with the question of how to justify the regulations it imposed.131 
"Technical reasons" and the "large financial investment" necessary to 
start a broadcast station are mentioned in passing as explanations for 
the different treatment of broadcast and press.132 In 1961, the Court 
elaborated on these "technical reasons," stating that chaos in electro-
magnetic spectra can only be avoided if all use of these spectra is 
regulated by the federal government.133 In both 1961 and 1971, the 
Court did not attempt to justify the public character of German broad-
cast. The primary reason for this lack of justification is that the public 
nature of broadcast was paradigmatic in Germany at the time; an 
alternative regime of multiple private offerors was hardly imaginable, 
and it certainly had no relevance for the reality of contemporary 
broadcast organization. 134 
128 /d. at 316. 
129 See id. at 316-17. This holding means that the option of an externally pluralistic organization 
does not constitute any presumption in favor of a press-like regime. In fact, the opinion forcefully 
rejects any such implication by giving legislatures full freedom of choosing any broadcast model, 
from public monopoly to dual model. See id. 
150 See id. 
131 See 12 BVerfGE at 261; see also 31 BVerfGE at 326. 
13212 BVerfGE at 261; 31 BVerfGE at 326. 
m12 BVerfGE at 230. 
1M In summarizing the position and meaning of broadcast in and for the German nation, the 
Court wrote: 
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By the time of the third broadcast decision in 1981, the situation 
had changed. As the Court then recognized, the technological and 
economic reasons for treating broadcast differently from the press 
were rapidly disappearing.135 Nevertheless, the Court kept the stringent 
regime of requiring legislation fully in place.136 By developing the 
concept of freedom in service of the values of pluralism and balanced 
opinion formation, the Court adapted the idea of broadcast as a matter 
of public responsibility for the new age of a potential multitude of 
broadcast offerors.137 
The Court's analysis is especially interesting because the Court de-
emphasized the economic and spectral scarcity rationales.138 Instead, 
the Court chose an approach that could not be made obsolete even by 
revolutionary technological developments. Thus, the Court's analysis 
remains applicable even in a world where electronic communication 
is not impeded by any kind of economic scarcity or scarcity of capac-
ity.l39 
The Court's scarcity-independent justification for its freedom of 
broadcast regime is based on a shift of the locus of distrust. Whereas, 
in traditional free speech theory, it is the government that is distrusted 
and restricted, the value-based free speech theory distrusts everything 
that is private, uncontrolled by official rules, unassociated with the 
state, and not part of a system that can be subjected to rational rules 
maximizing values determined by an intellectual elite. The Court's 
approach exemplifies this shift. Stated in a simplified way, the Court 
distrusts everything and everybody except itself and, with provisos, the 
In Germany, broadcasting has since 1926, traditionally fallen under the responsibility of 
public administration .... Mter 1945, the view of broadcast as a public responsibility 
was strengthened because broadcasting was given over to public corporations. . . . In 
sum, broadcast in Germany has become a public institution and a public responsibility. 
12 BVerfGE at 244-46. 
135 See 57 BVerfGE at 322-23. 
136 See id. at 322. 
137 See id. at 321-22. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. at 322. In its opinion, the Court stated: 
[T]he necessity of legislation regulating [broadcast] continues to exist even when the 
special situation of broadcast, caused by frequency scarcity and by the high financial 
investment necessary for engaging in broadcasting, is obviated by virtue of modern 
[technological] developments. 
/d. It is in this way that the Constitutional Court's analysis and those of Fiss and Sunstein are 
closely related. They justify state involvement in private speech by means other than reference to 
economic and technological shortcomings. 
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legislatures. Specifically, the Court distrusts the following entities to 
uphold the values protected by Article 5: ( 1) private broadcasters; (2) 
the market; and (3) the people.140 These three entities cannot assure 
that a democratically acceptable and desirable mix of opinions and 
viewpoints will be presented in the broadcast media. While there may 
be cause to assume that private broadcast will develop a level of plu-
ralism similar to that among large newspapers, such a development is 
not sufficiently guaranteed. 141 One future scenario may be a desirable 
marketplace of ideas, but another might be a dangerous concentration 
of speech power in the hands. of very few broadcasters. Thus, public 
opinion might be thrown out of balance. For this reason, a wait-and-see 
approach is not feasible. Pathological developments in this area are, 
according to the Court, reversible only under extreme difficulty, if at 
all. 142 The possibility of a few powerful, private individuals taking con-
trol of German public opinion must be banned as thoroughly as pos-
sible.143 Therefore, the Court eschews the "experimental" approach of 
allowing the broadcast system to monitor itself and instead adopts the 
method of "guaranteeing" the precious democratic value of freedom 
of broadcast by designing a complex constitutional system and enlist-
ing the full legislative power of state governments to bring about its 
realization. 144 Security and certainty with respect to committing broad-
cast to fundamental democratic and free speech values must be created 
through state action, supervised by the Court. 145 
The Court never examines its assumption that state power ensures 
more reliably than a free market approach that freedom of expression 
rights will be honored. 146 The Court believes that relying on state action 
is somehow less risky and less dangerous than relying on the private 
sector. Given the abuse of state power in Germany's own immediate 
history, it is surprising that these judges, genuinely committed to de-
mocracy and the liberal values of the Basic Law, would turn enthusias-
tically to the state and away from the market and the people. There is 
not a single passage in any of these opinions assessing and comparing 
the risks inherent in a basically state-free system with the risks inherent 
in a system that is structured by legislation and supervised by a sub-
146 See generally 57 BVerfGE at 320-24. 
141 /d. at 320; see also 83 BVerfGE at 315. 
142 57 BVerfGE at 323. 
143 /d. at 323-24. 
144 See id. at 320. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 320-24. 
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stantial administrative apparatus. The flaw in the Court's approach lies 
in its unwavering faith in the state's ability to bring about the desired 
ends with near-certainty and minimal risk. 147 
The following problems of private broadcast arise, according to the 
Constitutional Court, even if no scarcity problems limit the numbers 
of broadcasters: 
... [O]ne cannot expect private broadcast to offer program-
ming with broad and diverse contents because private offer-
ors finance their broadcasts virtually exclusively through in-
come from commercial advertising. This income can only be 
sufficiently high when the private programs achieve suf-
ficiently high ratings. Therefore, private broadcasters are un-
der an economic necessity to produce programs that are 
attractive to the masses, that are successful in maximizing the 
numbers of viewers and listeners, and that are as cheap as 
possible. Programs that are of interest only for a small portion 
of the audience and that are often very expensive-such as 
demanding cultural programs-can be expected to become 
rare, if not to disappear altogether. However, only with their 
presence can the whole breadth of comprehensive informa-
tion be achieved, without which opinion formation as guar-
anteed by Article 5.1 Sentence 2 of the Basic Law cannot 
exist. 148 
This critique is not inherently implausible. A broadcast market may 
have certain systemic weaknesses in its offerings for which a govern-
ment may legitimately wish to compensate by running non-commercial 
stations. However, by constitutionalizing a much more radical remedy 
than the mere provision of supplemental public channels, that is, by 
reading Article 5.1 as requiring all of broadcast to present the "whole 
breadth of comprehensive information," the Court locks the system of 
legislative responsibility for broadcast into place and permanently ex-
cludes a more libertarian approach. 149 Once the perceived flaws of a 
press-like broadcast structure are constitutionally entrenched as foun-
147 See 57 BVerfGE at 320-24. 
148 73 BVerfGE at 155-56. The Court reaffirms its position in 83 BVerfGE at 311. 
149 See id. In a more recent decision, the Court, after reaffirming the service character of the 
freedom of broadcast, repeated the constitutional demands on the overall broadcast offering: 
concrete breadth of all sections of the program and a representation of a balanced plurality of 
the opinions found in society at large. 87 BVerfGE 181, 197 (1992). The Court continued by 
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dational rationales for the service conception of the freedom of broad-
cast, the whole regulatory system becomes shielded from empirical 
evaluation. 150 
D. Roman Herzog: The Limitations of a Pragmatic Commentator 
The entrenchment of this constitutional system plays out interest-
ingly in the writings of the former President of the Constitutional 
Court, leading commentator on its Article 5 jurisprudence, and cur-
rent President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Roman Herzog. 
Herzog has participated in the Constitutional Court's broadcast deci-
sions since 1986. His extensive and constantly updated commentary 
on the broadcast question, which is part of the leading treatise on the 
Basic Law, provides insight into the thinking of Germany's most in-
fluential jurist in this area.151 
In his commentary, Herzog resists the notion that the concept of 
basic service constitutionally mandates the maintenance of public sta-
tions under all factual circumstances.152 Herzog believes that the "basic 
service" that the public stations provide should be a dynamic concept, 
one that cannot be defined for the future and must constantly be 
ascertained anew. 153 According to Herzog, there are two ways of achiev-
ing the constitutional aim of realizing the values underlying Article 5.1: 
by keeping basic service within the domain of the public stations, or 
by strengthening the programming requirements for private stations 
by way of legislation so they will deliver basic service. 154 The current 
realities of German broadcasting, however, make the second approach 
highly unfeasible. 155 
citing to its 1986 broadcast opinion, 73 BVerfGE at 155-56, for the proposition that the commer-
cial nature of private broadcast inherently disables it from meeting these demands. 87 BVerfGE 
at 199. Thus, a coexistence of public and private broadcast is constitutionally acceptable only if 
(a) the imbalances of private broadcast do not become significant, and (b) the public stations 
fully live up to the constitutional mandate and provide basic service to the population. !d. at 
198-200. 
I50 The same problems-naive reliance on governmental institutions and systematic disregard 
for empirical complications-beset Fiss's First Amendment theory. See infra notes 324-54 and 
accompanying text. 
151 See generally Herzog, supra note 23. 
152 !d. at 79. 
153 !d. 
154 !d. at 78-78a. Notably absent is the option of lowering legislative control and permitting 
viewers' choice and competition among many private offerors to replace state-"guaranteed" 
diversity and quality. See id. 
155 !d. Herzog may well be correct: basic service perhaps does not constitutionalize the existence 
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Herzog is a pragmatist. In his interpretation of the Court's rulings, 
he is intent on softening dogmatic pronouncements of the Court and 
on giving them a flexible dimension and allowing future empirical 
changes to bring about adaptations in constitutional law. Herzog dis-
agrees with the pronouncement of the Constitutional Court's 1981 
broadcast opinion, 156 which held that the choice of broadcast struc-
ture-internally or externally pluralistic-must be determined by the 
legislature under all circumstances.157 Instead, Herzog views this hold-
ing as limited to a period of transition from a time of technical limita-
tions to a time where such limitations have become immaterial. 158 
Upon the disappearance of most or all technological scarcities, Herzog 
would view the orthodox internally pluralistic model as unconstitu-
tional.159 
Herzog stops short, however, of endorsing the assimilation of the 
freedom of broadcast into the traditional freedom of the press even in 
a situation where there are no scarcities. Instead, Herzog simply asserts 
that there is a "central constitutional difference" between the press and 
film on the one hand, and broadcast on the other. 160 This difference 
consists of the assumption that balance and diversity are maintained 
automatically and without Court and state interference in press and 
film, while, with respect to broadcast, the legislatures are under a 
mandate to supervise and correct. 161 True, this has been the Court's 
position.162 But why? Should Herzog's thinking about the potential 
unconstitutionality of internal regulation of private broadcasters, ab-
sent significant scarcities, not lead him one step further and predict 
the end of the "central constitutional difference"? Regrettably, Herzog, 
like the Constitutional Court, does not even begin to engage in a 
comparative risk analysis of private versus state agency with respect to 
free speech. 
Instead, Herzog retreats to the two rationales discussed above, the 
need for guarantees and the inherent weakness of private unregulated 
broadcasting.163 In summarizing these two rationales, Herzog crystal-
of public broadcasting. But what the concept of basic service does accomplish is to constitution-
alize the fundamental regulability of all broadcasting. See id. 
156 57 BVerfGE at 325. 
157Herzog, supra note 23, at 78-78a. 
158 /d. at 75-75a. 
159 /d. at 77-77a. 
100 /d. at 77. 
161 /d. 
162 See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 322-24. 
163Herzog, supra note 23, at 77-77a. 
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lizes their weaknesses. 164 First, Herzog considers the relationship be-
tween balanced programming and the externally pluralistic arrange-
ment of private broadcasting.165 Herzog correctly perceives a tension 
between the continuing constitutional demand for state supervision 
over all programming and the externally pluralistic structure.166 Full 
realization of either element will annihilate the other: a purely exter-
nally pluralistic structure-as in the press-leads only to the possibility, 
but not to the guarantee, of sufficiently pluralistic and balanced pro-
gramming.167 On the other hand, pervasive state regulation would 
mean the death of the externally pluralistic model.l68 Therefore, ac-
cording to Herzog, the impulse towards a press-like structure and the 
need for a guarantee of constitutionally appropriate programming 
must be balanced against each other and brought into unison as much 
as possible so that both can have the greatest possible effect. 169 
Second, Herzog dismisses commercial private broadcast as being 
"the last thing one could wish for Germany."170 This quotation refers 
to the familiar complaint that commercial television is shallow and 
inattentive to public issues. 171 This complaint, however, is often unex-
amined; it typically remains a mere assertion. Elitist undercurrents, 
which always seem to underlie this complaint,172 can be perceived in 
both the writings of the Constitutional Court and of Herzog. The 
Constitutional Court fears that commercial broadcasting will lead to a 
significant reduction of "demanding cultural programs."173 Herzog re-
marks at one point, with intentional irony, that a station's dependency 
on commercials and thus on ratings does not permit programming on 
a "particularly high" level. 174 This is essentially the same concern as that 
164 See id. 
165 !d. 
166 !d. at 77a. 
167 !d. Not even as clearsighted a commentator as Herzog challenges the premise that state 
involvement in this area can guarantee anything (beyond weakening the defensive dimensions of 
the right to free speech). See id. 
168 Herzog, supra note 23, at 77a. 
169 !d. Herzog does not mention the alternative conclusion that regulation and the "externally 
pluralistic" model are ultimately incompatible and that regulation must stop once there are 
enough private broadcast offerors. See id. 
170 !d. at SOd. 
171 See, e.g., 73 BVerfGE at 155-56. 
172 Sunstein, as I shall argue below, is no exception in this regard. See infra notes 397-466 and 
accompanying text. 
173 73 BVerfGE at 155-56. The Constitutional Court, of course, does not define "demanding 
cultural programs" or explain why such programs are preferable. See id. 
174Herzog, supra note 23, at 78. 
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voiced by the Constitutional Court, 175 and not the type of empirical 
assessment on which constitutional theories should be erected. The 
Constitutional Court's and Herzog's elitist presumptions remain unex-
amined. The factual basis of the resulting claims is therefore dubious. 
Both the insistence on a guarantee of constitutionally acceptable 
programming, and the belief in the low-quality output of commercial 
television are, in the end, results of a reluctance to trust viewers to 
make the right decisions on their own. They show a conviction that 
the state is preferable to the people in fighting for democracy and 
pluralism. Why the people are untrustworthy, whether commercial 
broadcast output is or must be inferior to state-prescribed output, and, 
most importantly, why the state, of all things, should be the entity on 
which to rely when problems are projected to arise in a laissez-faire 
free speech regime-these questions remain unanswered. 
E. The Reality of State Regulation of Broadcast: Legislation and judicial 
Supervision in Germany 
Under the Constitutional Court's analysis, freedom of broadcast is a 
set of abstract norms to which program offerings must conform.176 The 
resulting idea of freedom as service necessitates pervasive state involve-
ment. The traditional right to free speech has been turned on its head. 
The Court's 1991 broadcast decision affords an excellent opportu-
nity for studying the governmental regulations that result from such a 
reversal of the libertarian free speech conception.177 In 1991, the Court 
examined and largely upheld the constitutionality of a state's legisla-
tion prescribing an internally pluralistic organization of private broad-
casting.178 Legislation of this kind is insidious. The broadcast realm 
becomes pervaded by state-created value judgments as to what consti-
tutes rich and comprehensive public debate and which voices are 
properly heard and suppressed in the public forum. Inevitably, the 
state becomes the provider of values for its citizens. 
1. Content Regulation of Private Broadcasting 
In its 1991 decision, the Constitutional Court upheld a state law that 
defined the substantive parameters for private broadcasters in the state 
175 73 BVerfGE at 155-56. 
176 See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 319-20. 
177 83 BVerfGE 238. 
178 ld. at 295-341. 
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ofNorthrhine-Westphalia.179 These provisions are interesting and wor-
thy of full citation. The government-created list of values that must be 
honored by private broadcasters constitutes an official espousal of a 
certain perspective on what is desirable for society and democracy. 180 
By ruling that the following provisions regulating private broadcasting 
in Northrhine-Westphalia were constitutional, the Court essentially 
endorsed a governmentally created ethics of human interaction: 
§11 
Programming Mission 
[Broadcast is] a medium of and factor in the process of the 
free formation of opinion and thus is of concern to the 
general public; in this way broadcasters fulfill a public func-
tion. Broadcast programs ... must contribute to comprehen-
sive information and free individual and public opinion for-
mation. Broadcast programs must serve education, coun-
seling, and entertainment; they must fulfill the cultural task 
of broadcast. Every broadcast channel must devote attention 
to public events in Northrhine-Westphalia. 
§ 12 
Basic Tenets of Programming 
(1) All broadcast programs must conform to the constitu-
tional order. The provisions of the general laws and the laws 
for the protection of personal honor must be respected. 
(2) Broadcast programs must respect the dignity of the hu-
man being. They ought to contribute to a strengthening of 
the respect for life, liberty, physical inviolateness, and the 
faith and opinion of others. The moral and religious convic-
tions of the population, as well as marriage and family, must 
be respected. Broadcast programs ought to foster understand-
ing among nations, they ought to admonish people to pursue 
peace and social justice, they ought to defend the democratic 
freedoms, they ought to contribute to equality between men 
and women, they ought to be committed to the truth. No 
broadcast program may take into account only one-sided and 
isolated opinions. No broadcast program may serve, in a 
one-sided fashion, one party, one group, one interest, one 
denomination, or one world view. 
179 !d. at 315-24. 
180 !d. at 249-50. 
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(3) In fulfilling its mission, every station's overall offering 
must express the diversity of opinions as broadly and com-
pletely as possible. The significant political, ideological, and 
social forces and groups must be represented in every sta-
tion's overall offering. Every station's overall offering must 
provide appropriate time for the treatment of controversial 
themes of general significance. 
( 4) Informational programs must respect recognized journal-
istic principles. News must be general, independent, and ra-
tional. Before they are aired, news programs must be checked 
concerning their content, origin, and truth, as far as the 
circumstances allow. Commentaries must be separated from 
the news in a clear fashion, and they must be labeled as such, 
giving the name of their authors.181 
These legislative enactments are more than politically correct sermon-
izing. The state makes decisions as to what values should be espoused 
on all private broadcasting; competing or conflicting standpoints are 
explicitly excluded and outlawed. Section 12(2) 182 is a dramatic in-
fringement on editorial freedom and an attempt by the state to control 
the messages of a whole medium. 183 What is surprising about this list 
of demands is not its general tenor-its labored inoffensiveness in 
favor of freedom, democracy, objectivity, truth, diversity, and family 
values-but its specificity. Private broadcasters must respect human 
dignity, the ethical and religious convictions of others, and the institu-
tions of marriage and family. 184 They must contribute to international 
understanding and to equal rights between men and women. 185 They 
may not run a single program that espouses only one viewpoint. 186 
But what about those who do not respect marriage, family, and the 
religious convictions of the majority, viewing an appeal to these insti-
tutions and beliefs to be ideological warfare on their non-traditional 
lifestyles? Those who find the expression "social justice" to be an 
emotional rallying cry of "bleeding-heart" liberals, a cry that may lead 
to ill-considered legislation with dangerous unintended consequences 
and that must be kept in check by cool economic reasoning? Those 
IBIJd. 
182 83 BVerfGE at 249. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. at 249-50. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
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who believe that broadcasting extreme viewpoints grabs people's atten-
tion and stimulates opponents to put forth their best arguments? 
Those who seek radical political change and thus wish to challenge the 
"constitutional order"? Thus, the gay activist, the hard-core libertarian, 
the political commentator with a strongly partisan agenda, or the 
socialist are systematically discriminated against in the name of liberal 
democratic inclusiveness. 
The law demands that broadcast programming be committed to 
tolerance and respect for others, balance of viewpoint, and objectiv-
ity.187 Partiality and one-sidedness are unlawful and, ultimately, uncon-
stitutional.188 This plainly creates the danger that broadcasters will 
avoid controversial programming and prevent strongly one-sided views 
from being expressed on the air. After all, any station that allows a 
program to take a strong stance on one side of an issue might, by 
adversaries of that stance, be accused of failing to meet the legal 
requirements ofbreadth, completeness, and balance. Perhaps in order 
to forestall this problem, the law includes a requirement that contro-
versial themes be appropriately covered.189 But this provision calls only 
for "appropriate" coverage of "controversial" topics of "general" inter-
est, without defining these terms. 190 The controversy coverage require-
ment can thus be expected to be virtually meaningless.191 
The danger of chilling speech (and perhaps even more of "dumbing 
down" speech, of making public discourse increasingly banal) by re-
quiring balance and fairness is great. In his commentary, Herzog freely 
admits that the chilling of speech is an unfortunate but inevitable side 
effect of an "internally pluralistic" structure of broadcast, such as the 
one chosen by the state of Northrhine-Westphalia for its private broad-
casters.192 What is perhaps most stunning about Herzog's admission is 
how matter-of-factly and uncritically it is given.193 Herzog simply de-
scribes a reality; he demonstrates no awareness that state-caused chill-
ing of sharply partisan speech is a fundamental indictment of any free 
speech order. 194 This is surprising in light of the fact that Herzog is not 
an adamant pro-regulation ideologue; on the contrary, he is a clear-
187 See 83 BVerfGE at 249-50. 
188 See, e.g., id. at 297. 
189 See id. at 249. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 Herzog, supra note 23, at 72. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. 
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sighted moderate who cares very much about allowing pluralism to 
flourish and preventing a strict application of pro-regulation constitu-
tional principles from choking off new developments. 195 Nevertheless, 
Herzog accepts without further comment or critique the limitations on 
vigorous speech that follow from an internal organization of broadcast 
stations: 
More importantly, from the demands that the Constitutional 
Court makes on the inner structure of broadcast stations 
follows not only an important guiding principle for the su-
pervisors' exercise of authority, but also a significant limita-
tion on the way in which the subordinates may exercise their 
rights: the Constitutional Court has held that, at least for 
public broadcasting, the balanced and reasonably objective 
information of the public is not achieved by the multiplicity 
of broadcast stations, but rather that such balance and ap-
proximate objectivity must be realized within every single 
broadcast station, that, in other words, tendencies and biases 
must be evened out within the individual stations. This prin-
ciple has an effect on the relation between supervisors and 
their subordinates in broadcast stations. In other words, the 
individual editor is to a much larger extent subject to criticisms of 
one-sidedness than this could be the case in the press or an exter-
nally pluralistic broadcast system. Under certain circumstances, it 
can be an irrefutable argument against airing his program that 
another program of the exactly opposite bias could, for whatever 
reasons, not be broadcast .... 196 
There is no hint here that the costs of chilling speech might have to 
be weighed against the gains oflegislating diversity. Herzog uncritically 
accepts these costs as natural consequences of the constitutional re-
gime to which the Constitutional Court has committed itself. But the 
chilling of partisan speech is not some minor shortcoming that a free 
speech jurisprudence can simply overlook. It is a problem that strikes 
195 See, e.g., id. at 74-74b. In this passage, Herzog criticizes the Court's belief that regulation 
and diversified editorial boards will lead to desirable programming. He argues that the unwieldy 
regulatory apparatus sanctioned by the Court is utterly unable to achieve the results naively 
envisioned by the Court. See id. 
196 Herzog, supra note 23, at 72 (emphasis added). Herzog addresses public stations here; 
however, his thoughts apply with equal force to similarly organized private stations. See id. 
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at the foundations of a constitutional order that allows such a problem 
to arise. 
2. Legislating Diversity 
The existence of legislatively created "diversity" regimes fosters the 
impression that the interests that must be included-and the resulting 
broadcast programming-are satisfactorily representative of diversity in 
Germany. Yet selectivity and exclusion are inevitable. The excluded 
groups and interests are therefore officially declared insignificant. This 
constitutes a more vicious and pervasive silencing than that effected 
by market operations, even insidious ones. When a television station 
in the United States withdraws a program on a controversial topic due 
to pressure from high-powered advertisers, the silencing is done out 
of purely commercial motives, motives to which no moral or societal 
authority attaches. Typically, the calculus of advertisers is simple. They 
do not want their products to be associated with certain controversial 
topics because that may hurt sales. The decision of the television 
station to withdraw the program may be cowardly, but it is nothing 
more than that. Furthermore, such a decision is itself likely to be the 
subject of media attention; news accounts of the event might bring the 
decision of the station managers to act as self-censors into the public 
eye and will give rise to discussions both about the actions of the parties 
involved and about the original controversy, the subject matter of the 
proposed program.197 
The situation in Germany is different. A group that does not make 
it on a state's television diversity list is silenced by more than a simple 
commercial calculation. It is excluded by the reasoned judgment of 
the state.198 If the Constitutional Court approves a state broadcast law, 
as it did in its 1991 broadcast opinion,199 a group's exclusion becomes 
sanctioned by what is perhaps the most respected governmental organ 
197The events surrounding the April 30, 1997 episode of the ABC sitcom "Ellen" are a good 
example. In that episode, the lead character of the show, played by Ellen DeGeneres, announced 
that she was a lesbian. Several prominent conservatives, among them the Rev. Jerry Falwell, urged 
an advertising boycott of the episode. See Mark Landler, Wave goodbye to the Bundys, blue-collar 
champions of the Fox network, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at D9. The reactions of advertisers to the 
"controversial" content of the show received considerable media attention. See, e.g., Dana Canedy, 
As the main character in "Ellen" comes out, some companies see an opportunity; others steer clear, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at DB; Courtney Kane, Only real surprise on ''Ellen" was lineup of advertisers, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1997, at D2. 
198 See, e.g., 83 BVerfGE at 270-72. 
199 83 BVerfGE 238. 
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in Germany. The group's exclusion is legalized, systemic, and perva-
sive. It gains a moral dimension. Furthermore, the exclusionary prac-
tice is made invisible by the constitutional claim that the resulting 
regime actually represents real diversity reflective of the population at 
large. Not to belittle the fight against cowardly advertisers and others 
interested in keeping controversy off the air in the United States, but 
the state-imposed pseudo-diversity of Germany presents problems of a 
much more severe and fundamental nature.200 
The following state law regulating the composition of a supervisory 
and decisionmaking board that controls licensing and programming 
of private broadcasters meets the Constitutional Court's requirements 
of guaranteeing a fostering of the values of Article 5.1.201 The law 
provides: 
§55 
Composition of the broadcast commission, time in office of 
its members 
(1) The broadcast commission consists of 41 members. Wo-
men are to be appropriately taken into account in the selec-
tion of members .... 
(2) Eleven members are elected by the state parliament .... 
(3) Eighteen members are selected from among the following 
organizations [one member from each category]: 
1. Protestants, 
2. Catholics, 
3.Jews, 
4. and 5. members of various unions, 
6. state employees, 
7. employers, 
8. manual workers and farmers, 
9. professionals, 
10. town and regional administrators, 
11. people active in charities, 
200 Sunstein's recently developed concept of "incompletely theorized agreements" allows him 
to address this problem head-Qn: "[I]ncompletely theorized agreements have the crucial function 
of reducing the political cost of enduring disagreements. If judges disavow large-scale theories, 
then losers in particular cases lose much less. They lose a decision, but not the world." CAss R. 
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND PoLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING]. For a discussion of this new work and its relation to Sunstein's Madisonian commit-
ments, see infra notes 259, 333, and 361. 
201 83 BVerfGE at 332. 
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12. athletes, 
13. consumers, 
14. environmentalists, 
15. young people, 
16. homeland and folkloristic organizations, 
17. the handicapped, 
18. family or women's groups. 
( 4) One member is selected from the resident aliens .... 
( 5) Eleven further members are selected from the areas of 
publishing, culture, art and science, as follows: 
1. a writer who is a member of the union for printing and 
paper, 
2. a member of the broadcast-film union or of the organi-
zation of theater actors, 
3. a musician, 
4. a journalist, 
5. a film or broadcast entrepreneur, 
6. a sculptor, 
7. a person who works in higher education, 
8. an education administrator, 
9. a newspaper publisher, 
10. a member of the German Society for Media Pedagogy 
and Communication Culture, 
11. someone active in public interest broadcasting or local 
broadcasting. 202 
113 
The forty-one people selected under the law are responsible for ensur-
ing that all relevant political and social positions and groups are ap-
propriately represented in the overall programming of private broad-
cast.203 In the process of upholding the law and accepting its strong 
focus on organized interests, the Constitutional Court explained that 
the legislature used the organizations named in the lists as proxies for 
202 Id. at 271-72. In the interest of intelligibility, I have abridged the descriptions of most of 
the groups from which members are to be selected. Entry (3)-17, for example, does not simply 
read "the handicapped." Rather, it gives the precise organizations from which the handicapped 
are to be selected: "a member from the German Association of the Victims of War and Armed 
Service, the Handicapped and those receiving Social Security Payments, State Section of 
Northrhine-Westphalia, or from the Reich Association of the Victims of War, the Handicapped 
and those receiving Social Security Payments and the Survivors of Those Killed in War, State 
Section of Northrhine-Westphalia." All entries are in this form, that is, all entries name specific 
organizations from which members are to be selected. 
20! See generally id. at 332-35. 
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representative social interests.204 The members of these organizations 
are not supposed to act in a partisan manner in favor of their specific 
organizations; rather, they are supposed to act as guardians of the 
public interest who contribute their specific experiences without en-
gaging in interest politicking.2°5 
Northrhine-Westphalia's broadcast law was challenged in court. 
The challenge issued from the political right, specifically, from Chris-
tian Democratic (CDU/CSU) members of the German parliament.206 
Among many other flaws the CDU/CSU found in the law, the conser-
vative plaintiffs challenged what they felt was essentially an overrepre-
sentation of liberal groups, in the contemporary American sense, and a 
concomitant underrepresentation of conservative groups. 207 The plain-
tiffs claimed in particular that the total absence of "Vertriebene" ("Ex-
pelled People") 208 among the members of the broadcast commission 
was evidently unconstitutional.209 These Vertriebene are ethnic Ger-
mans, and their descendants, who lived in what was formerly Eastern 
Prussia, Silesia, the Sudetenland, and similar territories and who, at 
the end of World War II, fled from the advancing Red Army into what 
later became the Federal Republic of Germany.210 The Vertriebene 
were and are a powerful conservative voice in German politics. 211 Not 
many conservative politicians have dared to affront this extremely vocal 
and well-connected group-which explains its substantial influence on 
conservative policy in post-war (West) Germany.212 
At any rate, the state government of Northrhine-Westphalia did not 
include the Vertriebene in its broadcast diversity list. 213 Rejecting the 
conservative plaintiffs' argument that the exclusion violated the diver-
sity requirement under the freedom of broadcast, as well as the equal 
protection provision of the Basic Law (Article 3), the Constitutional 
Court stated: 
The exclusion of the Vertriebene organizations in the broad-
cast commission does not violate [the equal protection provi-
204Jd. 
205 /d. 
20683 BVerfGE at 275-76. 
207 /d. at 283-85. 
208 See generaUy MARTIN A. LEE, THE BEAST AWAKENS 290-96 (1997). 
209 83 BVerfGE at 285. 
21o See generally LEE, supra note 208, at 290-96. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See 83 BVerfGE at 271-72. 
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sion or the freedom of broadcast]. Rather, the legislature was 
permitted to assume that, 45 years after the end of the war, 
the Vertriebene are integrated into the society of the Federal 
Republic. Most of the Vertriebene are not distinguishable any-
more by their financial situation. Rather, they are distinct 
from other social groups only by virtue of their geographic 
origin and the cultural peculiarities associated therewith. 
With respect to the second and third generation of Vertrie-
bene, their expulsion and loss of homeland recede, as a rule, 
into the background to such a degree that there is no factual 
basis for differentiating them [as a distinct group].214 
115 
The Constitutional Court's reasoning behind its rejection of the CDU I 
CSU's argument simply does not make any sense. It is exactly the 
"cultural peculiarities" associated with their geographic origin, and 
their resulting political positions, that establish the Vertriebene as a 
significant interest group.215 The statute, and the holding of the Con-
stitutional Court, deny editorial participation in Northrhine-West-
phalia's broadcast system to a discrete and powerful group on the basis 
of the facially absurd theory that a group must be distinguishable by 
its "financial situation" and loses its distinctiveness and relevance by 
virtue of the passage of time-in the case of the Vertriebene, no more 
than a few decades.216 Under that theory, few interest groups are safe 
from judicial decertification. But the Constitutional Court's unprinci-
pled diversity theory217 is the inevitable result of centralized attempts 
to capture and replicate the complexity of society at large. 218 Ultimately, 
as in the case of the Vertriebene, judicial decisions about diversity 
cannot be explained by anything other than the judges' personal 
sympathies or antipathies toward specific groups. 
214 ld. at 337-38. 
215 See LEE, supra note 208, at 290-96. 
216 See id. 
217 See 83 BVerfGE at 332-35. 
218 See id. 
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Ill. AMERICAN .ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MEDIA REGULATION 
A. The Basic Flaw 
In his concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic 
National Committee, U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Stewart stated: 
The First Amendment prohibits the Government from impos-
ing controls upon the press. Private broadcasters are surely 
part of the press .... Yet here the Court of Appeals held, and 
the dissenters today agree, that the First Amendment requires 
the Government to impose controls upon private broadcast-
ers-in order to preserve First Amendment "values." The 
appellate court accomplished this strange convolution by the 
simple device of holding that private broadcasters are Govern-
ment. This is a step along the path that could eventually lead 
to the proposition that private newspapers "are" Government. 
Freedom of the press would then be gone. In its place we 
would have such governmental controls upon the press as a 
majority of this Court at any particular moment might con-
sider First Amendment ''values" to require. It is a frightening 
specter.219 
Justice Stewart thus understood that the conceptual prerequisite for 
speech regulation is a substitution of the values protected by the right 
to free speech for the right to free speech itself.220 As the example of 
the freedom of broadcast in Germany demonstrates, this substitution 
leads to a transformation of the constitutional rule largely prohibiting 
government action into a rule requiring government action. The value 
interpretation of the right to free speech does not constitute a mere 
relaxation or partial modification of the traditional understanding. A 
modified interpretation of free speech rules in certain instances might 
be integrated with little friction into a freedom of speech jurispru-
dence directed primarily at protecting against state intrusion. 221 The 
German-style conception of freedom of speech to which Justice Stewart 
219 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 133 
( 1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
22° See id. Justice Stewart also understood that freedom of the press is gone once newspapers 
"are" government. /d. But transforming private newspapers into governmental actors for First 
Amendment purposes is exactly Sunstein's strategy. See infra notes 260-74 and accompanying 
text. 
221 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 81-88. 
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objects, on the other hand, is in direct conflict with the traditional 
defensive rule against state action.222 
B. Cass Sunstein: Germany as an Ideal for a New First Amendment 
Professor Sunstein 's book, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 
is, according to Professor Amar, "a must read for anyone who wants to 
think seriously about the free speech issues facing this generation. "223 
One can only agree with Amar's assessment. Sunstein's approach is 
broad, ranging from empirical analysis to high theory. 224 He attempts 
a "New Deal for speech,"225 a reconceptualization of the First Amend-
ment from a laissez-faire structure into a system that pursues more ra-
tionally what he calls "Madisonian" values.226 The New Deal for speech 
is an attempt to broaden dramatically the ability of the state to regulate 
certain speakers, particularly broadcasters and other mass media. Sun-
stein cites approvingly to the German Constitutional Court and to 
Supreme Courts of other European nations to support his new ideas 
about freedom of press and broadcast.227 Sunstein tries to blend 
the radical pro-regulation approach exemplified in the Constitutional 
Court's broadcast jurisprudence with conventional American First Am-
endment notions. His New Deal synthesis relies in large part on inte-
grating core ideas practiced by the Constitutional Court into the exist-
222 See Columbia Broadcasting System, 412 U.S. at 133. 
223 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY supra note 8, on dust cover. 
224 See generally id. 
225 /d. at ch. 2, passim 
226 Sunstein describes these Madisonian core values in the following way: 
The system of free expression is the foundation of [the process of public deliberation]. 
One of its basic goals is to ensure broad communication about matters of public concern 
among the citizenry at large and between citizens and representatives. Indeed, we might 
even define political truth as the outcome of this deliberative process, assuming that the 
process can approach or meet the appropriate conditions. Those conditions include 
adequate information; a norm of political equality, in which arguments matter but power 
and authority do not; an absence of strategic manipulation of information, perspective, 
processes, or outcomes in general; and a broad public orientation toward reaching right 
answers rather than serving self-interest, narrowly defined. It is not necessary to claim 
that the result of any such deliberative process will be unanimity or even consensus. 
Sometimes people genuinely disagree, and discussion will not bring them together. It 
may even tear them apart. We should also acknowledge that real-world processes do not 
conform to these conditions. But under the right circumstances, the system of public 
discussion should improve outcomes and help move judgments in appropriate direc-
tions. 
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 19. 
227 See id. at 77-81. 
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ing First Amendment framework in a way that leaves the framework 
nominally unchanged but substantively revolutionized. 
Sunstein provides the following perceptive description of the current 
media situation: · 
All in all, we have extraordinary diversity in speech outlets. 
Some current critics speak of "monopoly" of the broadcast or 
print media; but there are no real monopolies here. Many 
people, and many points of view, are able to have access to 
some part of the media. On every important count, a market 
system of this kind is much better than a system of centralized 
government control of speech. For this reason, it sometimes 
seems as if we are and should be, moving toward a conception 
of free expression in which the dominant understanding is 
one of antitrust law. Once we have broken up all interferences 
with the operation of the free market, and ensured against 
any vestige of monopoly, our free speech problems will be 
solved.228 
Of course, even a functional system like the one just described can 
have weaknesses, possibly severe ones. Sunstein provides many inter-
esting practical strategies for reform, some of them less intrusive, some 
of them involving extensive government action.229 Overall, Sunstein 
succeeds in "suggest[ing] possibilities that should be thought consis-
tent with the [traditional] First Amendment, not to defend an entirely 
new regulatory system. "230 Sunstein correctly cautions against a re-
flexive and unthinking First Amendment dogmatism when he states: 
What specific strategies for reform might emerge in the 
United States? The most important point is that the First 
Amendment should not operate as a talismanic or reflexive 
obstacle to our efforts to experiment with different strategies 
for achieving free speech goals. We should look carefully at 
the real-world consequences of various regulatory approach-
es, without thinking that any intrusion on broadcasters' 
choice of programming is automatically unacceptable.231 
22B /d. at 18. 
229 /d. at 81-88. 
230 /d. at 84. 
23! SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 81. 
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This approach is consistent with reform suggestions that leave existing 
First Amendment doctrine undisturbed or that constitute a reasonable 
extension or evolution of that doctrine. In light of this cautious ap-
proach with regard to concrete, practical suggestions, Sunstein's theo-
retical argument in favor of developing "something like a 'New Deal' 
for speech"232 raises serious questions.233 This "New Deal" is not some 
minor tinkering with existing First Amendment law. It is a wholesale 
remaking of the law. The revolutionary nature of Sunstein's restruc-
turing of the First Amendment is evidenced by, among other factors, 
his enthusiastic approval of the German Constitutional Court's ap-
proach to the freedom of broadcast question. 234 Sunstein's agreement 
with the Constitutional Court is not based on misunderstanding. He 
knows that the Court has held that an unregulated broadcast system is 
inconsistent with the Basic Law, even if scarcity of any kind ceases to 
be an issue. 235 He cites approvingly the passage from the Constitutional 
Court's 1981 opinion holding that the states are obliged to provide 
legislative guarantees against the risks of a libertarian system.236 In 
concluding his brief but accurate survey of German freedom of broad-
cast jurisprudence, Sunstein comments: 
From the German cases, then, we see an understanding of 
the free speech principle that overlaps a great deal with the 
Madisonian view. Germany of course has a relatively well-func-
tioning democratic system, one that is especially alert to the 
risks of tyranny in the wake of the Nazi experience. In these 
circumstances, it is highly revealing to see that the German 
Constitutional Court has understood its own free speech guar-
antee to require democratic principles and to repudiate mar-
ketplace thinking.237 
232 /d. at xix. 
233 See id. 
234 /d. at 77-79. 
235 /d. at 78. 
236SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 78-79. 
237 /d. at 79. Sunstein assumes that the fact that the Court's broadcast rulings were handed 
down "in the wake of the Nazi experience" makes them more trustworthy. Unfortunately, Sun-
stein's assumption is wrong. I believe that the Court's broadcast rulings reflect a peculiar and 
unproductive reaction to Nazism. Like many Germans, the judges seem to have a pathological 
fear of faction and polarization, a deep distrust of the people. The German government's recent 
efforts to stem the growth of Scientology are striking evidence of this fear. Judicial rulings based 
on such a misunderstanding of history should not serve as models for remaking the First 
Amendment. 
120 BosToN CoLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & CoMPARATIVE LAw REviEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
Sunstein formulates a theory of ultimate First Amendment values 
that is deeply informed by the thinking of Alexander Meiklejohn. 238 
Sunstein retains Meiklejohn's basic structure of granting full First 
Amendment protection to those speech activities that "are utilized for 
the governing of the nation,"239 while giving all others less protection.240 
Sunstein's Madisonian system: 
must have two minimal features. First, it must reflect lnoad and 
deep attention to public issues . ... The second requirement is 
that there must be public exposure to an appropriate diversity of 
view.24I 
Thus, Sunstein focuses on a "system" characterized by mandatory fea-
tures, by values that must be realized with the aid of the state in order 
for the entire free speech structure to conform to the demands of the 
First Amendment.242 Reading the Free Speech clause as mandating the 
realization of concrete positive values is, of course, exactly the strategy 
of the German Constitutional Court. Under the Constitutional Court's 
conception of freedom of expression, state action is constitutionally 
required. 243 
Sunstein evaluates the American system of free expression according 
to his two central Madisonian criteria, attention to public issues and 
viewpoint diversity, focusing his attention particularly on the mass 
media. He finds that "[o]n both key counts, the record of the current 
American system is at best quite mixed."244 Given that his criteria are 
expressions of ideals, a "quite mixed"-result is not necessarily an unfa-
vorable evaluation. Mter all, the mass media-or, as Sunstein refers to 
it, the "free speech market"245-functions in the real world, and in one 
of the most complex, diverse and contradiction-ridden parts of it. Any 
assessment of this "system of free expression by examining whether it 
generates broad and deep attention to public issues, and whether it 
brings about public exposure to an appropriate diversity of view,"246 
2!18 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 122. 
239 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, in SuPREME CouRT REVIEW 245, 
256 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1961). 
240 Sunstein lays out the resulting "two-tiered" system in great detail. SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 8, at 121-65. 
241 /d. at 20-21. 
242 See, e.g., id. at xix. 
243 See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 320. 
244 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 22. 
245 /d. at 23. 
~·16 /d. at 22. 
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should, however, take a broad and generous view of the realities it finds 
in order to be accurate and useful.247 Given the size and diversity of 
this nation, the analyst must be careful not to allow his own preferences 
to cloud the objectivity of his evaluation. Thus, it would seem that we 
are not in such bad shape after all. Remedial measures, not revolutions, 
are called for. 
Sunstein succumbs, however, to the inexorable inner logic of his 
First Amendment analysis which is rooted in a quest for values. Sun-
stein develops a theory248 that destroys the First Amendment as we 
know it. This theory is a response to problems that, given Sunstein's 
own exposition of them, are simply not grievous enough to justifY 
scrapping the 'Worthy Tradition. "249 Sunstein's complaints about the 
system boil down to a rather conventional and familiar list of issues 
often heard in connection with television: the excessive amounts of 
gossip about movie stars and athletes, the lack of substance, the com-
modification of politics, the promotion of a bland and conventional 
morality, the lack of real criticism, and a dearth of dissenting views 
from the left or right. 25° From this justifiable, if conventional, laundry 
list of media faults, Sunstein draws his conclusion: "If anything like this 
is true, the current system of free expression is nothing to celebrate. 
247 Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe emphasize the importance of taking a long-term 
perspective in assessing the validity of the empirical assumptions underlying the traditional First 
Amendment: 
[O]ur society share[s] [the] belief in the following three empirical assumptions. First, 
governmental control over editorial policies typically will be exercised in a discrimina-
tory fashion, privileging that which is in vogue, mainstream, and safe while handicap-
ping that which is not. Second, recipients--readers, listeners, viewers--are capable of 
judging the quality of a speaker's presentation and abandoning those speakers who do 
not measure up to the recipients' standards. Third, speakers compete within and across 
media for potential recipients, so that the public is constantly presented with a variety 
of viewpoints from which to choose. Further, it is only because we believe that markets 
for ideas and values operate in this fashion that we have chosen to place constitutional 
constraints on government's authority to regulate speech. We do not blush to admit that 
we believe these empirical assumptions to be true. Especially if we add ''for the most 
part and in the long run," which are the conditions that really matter. 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & LA. Powe, Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging 
Communications Media, 104 YALE LJ. 1719, 1732 (1995). 
249 See generally SuNSTEIN, DEMocRACY, supra note 8. This radical theorization contrasts 
strangely with Sunstein's practical and more concrete legal reform suggestions, which are not 
only reasonable and helpful, but also respectful of existing First Amendment doctrine. See id. at 
81-88. 
249 See KALVEN, supra note 1. 
250 See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 23. 
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And if anything like this is true, it is, I believe, the law-not nature, 
not freedom, and not 'private decisions'-that is responsible."251 
The leap from the diagnosis of the weaknesses in a diverse set of 
speech practices to a conclusion that the whole system is unworthy is 
unjustified. Given the way Sunstein sets up his test of the broadcast 
system, the system is in a no-win situation. Notwithstanding his claims 
to the contrary, Sunstein argues in a utopian fashion. 252 Sunstein uses 
the existence of a discrepancy between his ideal and the real world to 
justify condemning the latter and calling for a total revamping of 
existing First Amendment law. He writes: 
[O]ur current system of free expression does not serve the 
Madisonian ideal. Free markets in expression are incomplete-
ly adapted to the American conception of sovereignty and to 
the commitment to government by discussion. If we are to 
promote our founding ideals, we need to rethink our free speech 
principles. 253 
Accordingly, Sunstein takes a revolutionary step and argues that the 
state should have an active role in bringing about the Madisonian 
values, a role that, under his theory, is not just permitted but mandated 
by the First Amendment. Specifically, Sunstein states: 
My approach would produce significant changes in our un-
derstanding of the free speech guarantee. It would call for a 
large-scale revision in the view about when a law "abridges" 
the freedom of speech. At a minimum, it would mean that 
many imaginable democratic interferences with the auton-
251Jd. 
252 See id. at 22. "Of course, our expectations for a system of free expression should be realistic, 
not utopian." Id. 
253 Id. at 119 (emphasis added). F.A. Hayek discusses this error in a different context: 
True, if we want at any time to make sure that we achieve as quickly as we can all that 
is definitely known to be possible, the deliberate organization of all the resources to be 
devoted to that end is the best way. In the field of social security, to rely on the gradual 
evolution of suitable institutions would undoubtedly mean that some individual needs 
which a centralized organization would at once care for might for some time get 
inadequate attention. To the impatient reformer, who wiU be satisfied with nothing short of 
the immediate abolition of aU avoidable evils, the creation of a single apparatus with full 
powers to do what can be done now appears as the only appropriate method. In the long run, 
however, the price we have to pay for this, even in terms of the achievement in a 
particular field, may be very high. 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF UBERTY 287-88 (1960) (emphasis added). 
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omy of broadcasters or newspapers are not "abridgments" at 
all. On the contrary, such autonomy, guaranteed as it is fly law, 
may itself be an abridgment of the free speech right. 254 
123 
This is closely related to the Constitutional Court's theory of freedom 
of broadcast.255 "Autonomy,"256 which in this context means freedom 
from state interference,257 can be an abridgment of the First Amend-
ment only if the First Amendment imposes a duty on the state to act 
in pursuit of First Amendment values. As long as the First Amendment 
merely instructs the state to refrain from action, state inaction and the 
broadcast speaker's resulting autonomy do not implicate the First 
Amendment. But under any freedom-as-service conception of free 
speech, be it the German or the Sunsteinian one, state inaction may 
by itself be unconstitutional. 
While Sunstein rejects the free speech market and adopts the value-
activist First Amendment, he acknowledges the advantages that a mar-
ket system has over centralized speech control. 258 Given these advan-
tages, it simply cannot be correct that a laissez-faire system contributes 
nothing at all to free speech values. Any free speech structure must 
be-by virtue ofits having to function in the real world-"incompletely 
adapted" to whatever free speech ideals we can formulate. This is true 
of a state-regulated system as well as of a market-based system. In the 
real world, perfection is unattainable, its lack therefore unremarkable. 
But Sunstein's uncompromising absolutism when it comes to justifying 
his new theory overrides the sensitivity to empirical considerations he 
otherwise shows throughout his book when he engages in concrete 
reform rather than in theoretical rethinking.259 
254 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at xix. 
255 See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 320. 
256SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at xix. 
257Jd.; see also 57 BVerfGE at 320. 
258 See, e.g., SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 18. "On every important count, a market 
system of this kind is much better than a system of centralized government control of speech." 
/d. 
259 Concerning the significance of Madisonianism in Sunstein's First Amendment theory, Burt 
Newborne observed: "As with most academic grand theory, Professor Sunstein needs a prime 
value to run his machine. He chooses political equality." Burt Newborne, Blues fur the Left Hand: 
A Critique oJCass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free speech, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 441 
(1995). In a new book, Sunstein endorses a more value-pluralistic outlook: 
Human morality recognizes irreducibly diverse goods, which cannot be subsumed under 
a single "master" value. The same is true for the moral values reflected in the law. Any 
simple, general, and monistic or single-valued theory of a large area of the law-free 
speech, contracts, property-is likely to be too crude to fit with our best understandings 
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Sunstein's theoretical radicalism contrasts strangely with his concern 
with preserving the appearances of the traditional First Amendment 
structure.260 By reinterpreting certain familiar First Amendment con-
of the multiple values that are at stake in that area. It would be absurd to try to organize 
legal judgments through a single conception of value. What can be said about law as a 
whole can be said about many particular areas of law. Monistic theories of free speech 
or property rights, for example, will fail to accommodate the range of values that speech 
and property implicate. Free speech promotes not simply democracy, but personal 
autonomy, economic progress, self-development, and other goals as well. Property rights 
are important not only for economic prosperity, but for democracy and autonomy too. 
We are unlikely to be able to appreciate the diverse values at stake, and to describe them 
with the specificity they deserve, unless we investigate the details of particular disputes. 
SuNSTEIN, LEGAL REAsONING, supra note 200, at 43. This rejection of "monistic theories" is based 
on the book's central concept: the "incompletely theorized agreement." Sunstein describes the 
concept as follows: 
Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in law and society. It is quite 
rare for a person or group completely to theorize any subject, that is, to accept both a 
general theory and a series of steps connecting that theory to concrete conclusions. 
Thus we often have in law an incompletely theorized agreement on a general principle-in-
completely theorized in the sense that people who accept the principle need not agree 
on what it entails in particular cases. 
Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). Sunstein's embracing of pluralist First Amendment values in the 
context of developing an account of "incompletely theorized agreements" conflicts with his 
absolutist commitment to Madisonianism. See also infra notes 333 and 361. 
260 Sunstein's book is paradoxical in this regard. A sizable portion of the book is comprised of 
an illuminating discussion of strategies available under the traditional First Amendment for 
furthering desirable ends such as reforming campaign finance and enhancing the quality of 
political debate on television. These strategies, which can be used without resorting to the "New 
Deal for speech," seriously weaken Sunstein's proclaimed need for the "New Deal." J.M. Balkin 
has commented on this curious feature of Sunstein's work: 
What is most interesting about Sunstein's reforms, in fact, is not so much their specific 
content as the striking contrast between their relative modesty and the strong distrust 
of consumer choice and viewer preferences expressed in this book. Sunstein's theoreti-
cal bark is much worse than his practical bite. One reason for this discrepancy is that 
Sunstein is not only a gifted theoretician but also a person of impeccably sound judg-
ment .... He is therefore unwilling to carry any of the principles he espouses to their 
logical, if potentially absurd, conclusions. Moreover, the fact that he is unwilling to do 
this should be understood less as a sign of his lack of consistency than of pragmatic 
good sense triumphing over academic excess. 
J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE LJ. 1935, 1978 
(1995). This does not quite alleviate my unease about Sunstein's theory. As Balkin acknowledges, 
Sunstein's practical suggestions do not constitute a refutation or necessary limitation of his theory. 
The theory has a life of its own and deserves to be attacked independent of the reasonable reform 
suggestions with which it may be surrounded. Burt Newborne has emphasized the need to refute 
Sunstein' s theory while taking seriously his practical criticisms of the broadcast system and his 
reform suggestions: 
As a thoughtful indictment of the ways our current system of free speech falls short of 
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cepts, particularly the state action requirement, Sunstein attempts to 
create the appearance that his new First Amendment is really not much 
different from the old one.261 Sunstein strongly affirms the traditional 
limitation of the First Amendment to government action only, and 
proclaims his commitment to this traditional constitutional category.262 
This might seem paradoxical since broadcasters and newspapers are 
not government entities and hence are not subject to the regulations 
that Sunstein desires. Sunstein avoids the clash of the state action 
doctrine with his newly proclaimed Madisonian First Amendment by 
defining out of existence the notion of private, state-free action.263 In 
this manner, everything of relevance in the mass media context is 
converted into government action. Sunstein first states: 
I do not argue that private acts are governed by the Consti-
tution. In fact, we should enthusiastically agree that the First 
Amendment is aimed only at governmental action, and that 
private conduct raises no constitutional questions. The con-
stitutional text aims at "Congress," not at the owners of news-
papers and radio stations. A central principle of American 
constitutionalism is that the most serious risks to liberty come 
from government, which has a monopoly on the legal use of 
force. This principle is far from uncontroversial; private 
power can be an obstacle to liberty, including liberty of ex-
pression. But freedom is often promoted if we allow the 
private sector to operate without constitutional constraint. In 
any case, there can be no violation of the First Amendment 
unless some government action has "abridged the freedom 
of speech." That action must usually take the form of a law 
or regulation.264 
Sunstein then asserts that "governmental rules lie behind and create 
rights of property, contract, and tort. This is true especially insofar as 
legal rules grant people rights of exclusive ownership and use of prop-
an ideal one, Sunstein's book is a welcome reminder of the need for reform, especially 
in areas where speech and money combine to create an unhealthy sludge ofinformation 
and power. But as a blueprint for radical change in First Amendment theory, I find 
Professor Sunstein's thesis unworkable, unnecessary, and dangerous. 
Newborne, supra note 259, at 432-33. 
261 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 36. 
262 /d. 
263 See id. at 109-10. 
264 /d. at 36. 
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erty."265 Since, "[t]o find a constitutional question, we always need to 
find some genuine exercise of public power,"266 the question becomes: 
what constitutes an exercise of public power? 
Sunstein views a private entity's enjoyment of the protection of the 
general laws of property and contract as governmental action in the 
same way that the bestowal of a "license" or other specific privilege 
upon an individual private actor qualifies as government action.267 
According to Sunstein, the presence of "governmentally conferred" 
rights in both cases makes it impossible to distinguish between the two 
situations on the basis of government's playing a greater or lesser role. 
Sunstein argues: 
Newspapers are given explicit, exclusive property rights by 
government, and it is these exclusive rights that enable news-
papers to exclude other people. The New York Times is able 
to exclude others only because of the law. Without the law of 
trespass, the right of exclusion would be much less effective. 
This is very much like the grant of a "license" to the New York 
Times. The grant of "licenses" of this kind may be conspicuous 
only in the broadcasting context, but that is just because 
property law tends to be invisible as law. There is no respect 
in which the exclusive rights of broadcasters are more "gov-
ernmentally conferred" than the exclusive rights of newspa-
pers. Government confers the relevant rights in both cases. I 
reiterate that this does not mean that property rights are bad 
or that we should restrict them. But it does mean that any 
distinction between broadcasters and newspapers cannot be 
justified on the ground that broadcasters are the recipient of 
government licenses. Both broadcasters and newspapers have 
been allocated some rights, but not others, by government. 
Nothing in the original allocation of rights justifies a greater 
role for government over broadcasters or a lesser role for 
government over newspapers.268 
This argument gains its full power when combined with the pursuit 
of Madisonian free speech values. According to Sunstein, the decision 
265 /d. 
266SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 37. 
267 /d. at 109-10. 
268 /d. The issue, however, is not conspicuousness v. invisibility (ideological categories); rather, 
it is specificity v. generality (logical categories). 
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of whether a certain act qualifies as state action must be informed by 
the desire to further those values. 269 The state action requirement, 
which he praises as a cornerstone criterion for determining constitu-
tional relevance, has thus little independent meaning. It is primarily a 
tool in the service of Madisonianism: 
What I want to suggest here is, first and foremost, that legal 
rules designed to promote freedom of speech should not be 
invalidated if their purposes and effects are constitutionally 
valid, even if they conspicuously intrude on the rights of some 
property owners and even some speakers. The issue of consti-
tutional validity should be assessed in Madisonian terms: Do the 
rules promote greater attention to public issues? Do they 
ensure greater diversity of view? If these are the relevant 
questions, a governmental requirement of free air time for 
candidates would be constitutional. We may also conclude 
that some legal rules of property ownership do violate the 
First Amendment, and in some surprising places, if and when 
such rules are invoked by property owners to "abridge the 
freedom of speech" by preventing people from speaking at 
certain times and places. 270 
Sunstein 's Madisonian conception of free speech thus calls for regula-
tion in service of the First Amendment's core values. Madisonian values 
and the First Amendment have become co-extensive. The state action 
requirement, traditionally limiting the range of situations where the 
First Amendment can be invoked, has been turned on its head justify-
ing far-reaching state regulation in service of the First Amendment.271 
Sunstein's position is, in essence, that the New Deal has taught us 
that there is no state of nature in our society. Rather, everything is 
structured by laws (which often operate invisibly and imperceptibly) .272 
269 /d. at 37-38. 
270 /d. (emphasis added). 
27! "Under Sunstein's theory, every piece of printed matter produced in this country depends 
"at bottom on the availability of invoking the mechanisms of government to prevent private 
interference with its production. Every speech, every political protest, and every rally also depends 
on the threat that interference with those activities will be punished under the law. Every 
telephone conversation, fax, and e-mail that addresses political issues owes its existence in some 
sense to the establishment of phone lines through public rights-of-way. In all of these cases, 
'[g]overnment confers the relevant rights,'[] opening the way to regulation of even outright 
political speech." Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment and the Metaphor Of Free Trade, 38 
ARiz. L. REv. ll25, ll37 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
272SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 36-37. 
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The private realm is, in fact, the result of specific governmental power 
and rights allocations. 
Even if one accepts this premise, Sunstein's conclusion does not 
follow. Sunstein discards crucial distinctions. The law of trespass, under 
which a newspaper has control over its physical premises, is labeled 
"allocation of rights. "273 A broadcast license is labeled "allocation of 
rights. "274 But these allocations of rights do not operate at the same 
level of specificity. Nominal identity does not justifY identical treat-
ment. If we want to retain the state action requirement as a meaningful 
concept of American constitutional law, it is incoherent to annihilate 
the requirement by universalizing it. Is there any aspect of human life 
that would escape the "state action" label as Sunstein understands it? 
It would have to be an aspect that is totally unaffected by any "alloca-
tion of rights." Such an aspect may be impossible to find. The expan-
siveness of Sunstein's state action theory causes the theory to self-de-
struct. 
C. Owen Fiss and the State as Friend 
Professor Fiss has developed a theory of free speech that makes 
government regulation an integral part of the First Amendment. 275 Fiss 
argues for a reinterpretation of our core understanding of the First 
Amendment, away from a legal regime that only constrains state action 
and interference and toward a new system in which the state acts 
openly as guarantor of the central free speech values.276 This is accom-
plished by actively intervening .in the realm of speech and in the 
exchange of ideas, amplifYing the speech of some, subduing that of 
others, making sure all relevant voices get heard in proper proportion-
ality. Sound familiar? Fiss has reinvented the freedom of broadcast 
jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court.277 However, his 
"state as guarantor" conception of the constitutional free speech right 
is even broader than that of the Constitutional Court. There is no 
273 Id. at 110. 
274[d. 
275 FISS, IRONY, supra note l. 
276 See, e.g., id. at 3-4. 
277 See id. at 83; 57 BVerfGE at 320. Fiss writes: ''The autonomy protected by the First Amend-
ment and rightly enjoyed by individuals and the press is not an end in itself, as it might be in 
some moral code, but is rather a means to further the democratic values underlying the Bill of 
Rights." F1ss, IRONY, supra note l, at 83. The German Constitutional Court writes: ''The freedom 
of broadcast is primarily a freedom ... in service of the freedom of opinion formation." 57 
BVerfGE at 320. 
1998] NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 129 
unregulated press existing alongside a regulated broadcast in Fiss's 
new constitutional order. 278 The Fissian reconceptualization of the First 
Amendment as a serving freedom would extend to any and all speech 
issues.279 
Fiss's reconstruction of the right to free speech as a call for the state 
to act is not any more successful than Sunstein 's or that of the German 
Constitutional Court.280 If anything, Fiss's clarity, his intellectual hon-
esty, and the thoroughness with which he pursues his task highlight 
the shortcomings and problems of the service conception of free 
speech that I have previously diagnosed. 
Immediately, Fiss puts his cards on the table. "We are being invited, 
indeed required, to re-examine the nature of the modern state and to 
see whether it has any role in preserving our most basic freedoms .... 
I will try to explain why the traditional presumption against the State 
(as the natural enemy of freedom) is misleading and how the state 
might become the friend, rather than the enemy, of freedom. "281 Fiss 
then states that his view is fundamentally predicated "on a theory of 
the First Amendment and its guarantee of free speech that emphasizes 
social, rather than individualistic, values. The freedom the state may 
be called upon to foster is a public freedom. "282 As in the case of the 
German freedom of broadcast, the shift from state as enemy to state 
as friend is to be accomplished by emphasizing certain values under-
lying the right to free speech. Immediately, a discussion of values takes 
center stage. 
278 See, e.g., 12 BVerfGE at 260-62. 
279fiss's work seems to have an initial advantage over the German development of the identical 
doctrine. He has the opportunity to develop afresh a doctrine that the Constitutional Court had 
to create in the context of ruling on legal controversies, with their attendant constraints, compli-
cations, and compromises. In addition, the German approach to broadcast regulation was, as I 
have argued above, born originally out of historical contingency, namely the existence of only 
one television channel, that was only subsequently transformed into the service idea of the 
freedom of broadcast. Thus, one might think that the many blind spots in the German rationale 
underlying the service conception of freedom of broadcast are partly the consequence of the 
Court's instinctive acceptance of existing legal and regulatory structures rather than weaknesses 
inherent in the theory itself. Fiss, on the other hand, must accept far fewer founding realities for 
his theory than could the Constitutional Court. He can develop it from scratch. His fresh start 
does not, however, lead to a better, more convincing result than the efforts of the Constitutional 
Court, thus confirming this article's thesis that the weaknesses of the value approach to free 
speech are inherent and irremediable. 
280 See supra Parts II and III(B). 
281 F1ss, IRONY, supra note I, at 2. 
282Jd. 
130 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
The value Fiss favors is "protection of popular sovereignty,"283 that is, 
the broadening of "the terms of public discussion as a way of enabling 
common citizens to become aware of the issues before them and of 
the arguments on all sides and thus to pursue their ends fully and 
freely. A distinction is thus drawn between a libertarian and a demo-
cratic theory of speech, and it is the latter that impels my inquiry into 
the ways that the state may enhance our freedom. "284 The libertarian 
theory of the First Amendment emphasizing speaker autonomy col-
lapses, according to Fiss's analysis, into the collectivist rationale: "The 
autonomy protected by the First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by 
individuals and the press is not an end in itself, as it might be in some 
moral code, but is rather a means to further the democratic values 
underlying the Bill of Rights."285 It is the core value of public sover-
eignty and collective self-determination that is driving Fiss's theoretical 
machinery. 286 However, none of this has yet altered existing First 
Amendment doctrine or has even begun to point to a reason why the 
First Amendment should embrace, rather than reject, the state. As Fiss 
points out correctly, many First Amendment thinkers have believed 
that the value of collective self-determination is central in any free 
speech order.287 How does Fiss use this proposition not only to call 
upon the state to act in furtherance of the First Amendment, but in 
fact to require the state to do so under the (new) First Amendment 
itself? 
The transition from a First Amendment of minimal to one of maxi-
mal state involvement is achieved on a level of high theory and abstrac-
tion. Concrete and obvious problems created by the new order are 
discussed, if at all, only as issues deserving of a certain amount of 
attention under the new order-but not as considerations that might 
counsel against establishing the new order in the first place. Despite 
the lucidity and honesty of Fiss's exposition and his deliberate efforts 
not to avoid tough questions, the most important questions surround-
ing Fiss's commitment to a First Amendment as a serving freedom in 
the German style are never given adequate consideration. 
283 /d. 
284 /d. at 3. Again, Fiss's theory is closely related to that of the German Constitutional Court. 
See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text, quoting 57 BVerfGE at 319-20. 
285 /d. at 83. 
286 See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 1-4. 
287 /d. at 2. 
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Fiss summarizes the First Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court in the following way: 
The precise location of [the narrow boundary around the 
state's regulatory authority] has varied from age to age and 
from Court to Court, and even from Justice to Justice, but its 
position has always reflected a balance of two conflicting 
interests-the value of free expression versus the interests 
advanced by the state to support regulation (the so-called 
countervalues). Sometimes the accommodation of conflict-
ing interests has been achieved through the promulgation of 
a number of categories of speech that may be subject to 
regulation. For example, the state has been allowed to regu-
late "fighting words" but not the "general advocacy of ideas." 
In other cases, the Court engaged in a more open and explicit 
balancing process in weighing the state's interest against that 
of free speech. The rule that allows the state to suppress 
speech that poses a "clear and present danger" to a vital state 
interest might be the best example of this approach. In either 
instance, the Court has tried, sometimes more successfully 
than others, to attend to both value and countervalue and to 
seek an accommodation of the two. 288 
Fiss's analysis shows that the concepts of "value" and "balancing" are 
key ingredients in his constitutional system centered on state activism. 
The framing of the central issue in terms of value does the work for 
Fiss here. By invoking a balance of fundamental values as the founda-
tion of the existing First Amendment, Fiss creates a strategically useful 
premise that conceptually facilitates his rewriting of the entire First 
Amendment in terms of value trade-offs. 
288 /d. at 5. Conceiving of the 'Worthy Tradition" as fundamentally a balancing act of competing 
values destroys the considerable doctrinal stability and solidity of that tradition. Such a conception 
ignores the complicated set of rules and doctrines that constitute the concrete First Amendment 
today. These rules and doctrines act to eliminate as far as possible the balancing of values. Instead, 
they provide categories that judges can apply without reference to underlying principles and 
justifications. In fact, the entire structure of the current First Amendment is one fundamentally 
informed by a categorizing, rather than a balancing, approach. The exalted status of free speech 
in the American legal system is a result of categorically elevating the idea of freedom from state 
interference in speech matters above almost all conceivable countervalues, thus obliterating the 
kinds of tradeoffs between competing constitutional values that are so characteristic of German 
constitutional theory and practice. See, e.g., 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) and discussion supra notes 
46-59 and accompanying text. 
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Fiss analyzes the countervalues of the 1960s that were brought forth 
in opposition to the First Amendment, correctly finding them lacking 
in merit. "The Supreme Court listened to that defense [Southern states 
attempting to preserve order] with some measure of seriousness, but 
the plea on behalf of maintaining order was impeached by the racial 
policies the states were pursuing in the name of that value. "289 In short, 
then, the Warren Court's free speech cases "were not a true test of 
Kalven's faith that free speech would prevail"290 because the counter-
values were so weak and the balancing therefore so easy. In sharp 
contrast, the contemporary countervalues arising out of the debates 
on hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance "have an unusu-
ally compelling quality."291 Consequently, "in confronting the regula-
tion of hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance today, many 
liberals find it difficult to choose freedom of speech over the counter-
values being threatened. "292 Fiss asserts that these powerful modern 
countervalues embody equality interests, in contrast to the liberty in-
terests of the First Amendment.293 The problem therefore is how to 
resolve the "conflict between liberty and equality,"294 that is, how to 
resolve the emerging conflict between the First Amendment and the 
Fourteenth. Given that the Fourteenth Amendment values that come 
into play here have become "architectonic"295 in modern constitutional 
law and that therefore the "firstness of the First Amendment appears 
to be little more than an assertion or slogan, "296 there is, according to 
Fiss, "no principled way of resolving the conflict between liberty and 
equality. "297 
Fiss's statement of the problem implies his preferred solution. Every-
thing has become a conflict of values. The underlying values of the 
First Amendment conflict with the underlying values of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Since both the values and the countervalues are "archi-
tectonic" in the American constitutional order, there is no higher or 
ultimate principle that we could use as a criterion in guiding our 
decision whether liberty or equality should be given preference.298 In 
289FISS, IRONY, supra note 1, at 7. 
290 /d. at 8. 
291 /d. at 9. 
292 /d. at 10. 
293 /d. 
294 FISS, IRONY, supra note 1, at 12. 
295 /d. at 11. 
296 /d. at 12. 
297 Id. at 15. 
298 By now it has become doubtful which is which, or whether the value-countervalue distinction 
makes any sense at all. 
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the Fissian hierarchy of constitutional values, we have reached an 
impasse since two master values, both of the highest rank, have come 
into conflict. 
Having set up the problem in terms of competing ultimate values, 
Fiss proposes an elegant solution that synthesizes and harmonizes the 
clashing value systems.299 Fiss eliminates the countervalues by integrat-
ing them into the value system with which they originally seemed to 
conflict.300 The central contemporaneous countervalue, equality, is par-
ticularly relevant with respect to traditional First Amendment prob-
lems, such as hate speech, pornography, and campaign finance. 301 The 
fact that the "architectonic" notion of equality302 persistently arises in 
the midst of First Amendment discussions allows Fiss to reconceptual-
ize equality as a First Amendment, rather than purely a Fourteenth 
Amendment, interest. Fiss reasons: 
We may have to live with this sorry state of affairs; but there 
may be another way of framing the issue that moves beyond 
this battle between transcendent values. Perhaps the regula-
tions in question can be seen as themselves furthering, rather 
than limiting, freedom of speech. This understanding ofwhat 
the state is seeking to accomplish would transform what at 
first seemed to be a conflict between liberty and equality into 
a conflict between liberty and liberty. This formulation would 
not make all disagreements go away, nor would it obviate the 
need for hard choices, but it would place those choices within 
a common matrix. It would make the controversy over regula-
tion less a battle over ultimate values, a fruitless inquiry into 
whether the Fourteenth or the First Amendment comes first, 
and more a disagreement among strong-minded people 
working to achieve a common purpose: free speech.303 
Free speech values are now on both sides of the equation. This obviates 
the need for decisions among ultimate values. According to Fiss, such 
decisions cannot be made in a principled way. 304 Thus, all that is left 
299 See generally Frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 15. 
~00 /d. 
~01 /d. at 10. 
~02 /d. at 11. 
~0~ /d. at 15. Fiss's reasoning is highly reminiscent of the Constitutional Court's approach, set 
forth in 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (Liith) and exemplified in 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) (Mephisto), 
whose central concern is exactly to place tough choices among constitutional rights "within a 
common matrix." /d.; see generally supra Part II(A). 
~04 See Frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 15. 
134 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
to decide is what is best for free speech. Somebody, however, must 
make this decision. That somebody is the state. 
Fiss's argument transforms the First Amendment into a set of obli-
gations on the state affirmatively to pursue and bring about robust 
public debate. Fiss states: 
The First Amendment is generally viewed as the most libertar-
ian of all constitutional provisions, the constitutional breed-
ing ground for state minimalism. So if we can see that the 
NEA and other speech-subsidy programs are consistent with, 
indeed favored by, the First Amendment, then the constitu-
tional foundation for rejecting the classic liberal ideal of the 
minimal state and emlrracing state activism in meeting all man-
ner of needs will have been placed on the most secure footing. 305 
The First Amendment as rewritten by Fiss might read something like 
this: The state is the guarantor of robust public debate and shall act to 
whatever extent necessary to make robust public debate a reality in the United 
States. Fiss reasons: 
[T]he First Amendment should be more embracing of [regu-
lation trying to preserve the fullness of debate], since that 
regulation seeks to further the democratic values that under-
lie the First Amendment itself.306 
Under traditional free speech doctrine, the presumptions in favor 
of the speech interest, understood to mean freedom from state inter-
ference, are paramount. The real difficulty with that doctrine lies, for 
Fiss, not in the "unprincipled" way in which disputes between strong 
values are resolved;307 rather, it lies in the fact that this type of First 
Amendment regime will only occasionally, and only grudgingly, accept 
the state as "friend," and even then only as friend of some other value, 
rather than as friend of speech values.308 Once First Amendment values 
are on both sides of the equation, however, any presumption against 
state interference is eliminated. Under Fiss's preferred rule, the ques-
tion is not whether the equality interest on the other side of the 
lawsuit is strong enough to overcome the First Amendment presump-
tion against state regulation of speech.309 Rather, since the interests on 
305 /d. at 49 (emphasis added). 
306 ld. at 19. 
307 !d. at 15. 
308 /d. at 5. 
309 Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 15. 
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both sides are now First Amendment interests, a court faces the pro-
ductive task of furthering these interests, rather than the "fruitless 
inquiry" into which competing value comes first. 310 This is the essence 
of the transformation of the First Amendment advocated by Fiss. 
If American courts adopt Fiss's First Amendment theory, the state 
will become the guarantor of the First Amendment, the prime activist 
in the United States in pursuit of the central free speech ideal-col-
lective self-determination through robust public debate. The state will 
now act as a "fair parliamentarian"311 by substantively interfering in 
actual speech practices, telling certain speakers that are disfavored 
under the public debate rationale to keep quiet for a while312 and 
giving other, weaker speakers megaphones so they can be heard in the 
public debate.313 In short, state regulation becomes the core rule under 
Fiss's First Amendment. 
Motivating Fiss's remaking of the First Amendment is his belief that 
"[o]ver the past twenty-five years a new Court has come into being, and 
with it a new First Amendment jurisprudence. "314 Fiss argues that the 
prominent First Amendment decisions of these years, Miami Herald, 
Pacific Gas & Electric, Buckley v. Valeo, RA. V. v. St. Paul, and Rust v. 
Sullivan,315 "represent a turn away from a democratic theory of the First 
Amendment and a move toward a more libertarian one. Common to 
all these decisions is a marked hostility toward the state and a refusal 
to acknowledge the role the state can play in furthering freedom of 
speech. "316 Concretely, Fiss fears that these decisions, and particularly 
Rust v. Sullivan and Pacific Gas & Electric, could do immeasurable 
damage to the state in its role as allocator of resources through, for 
example, the NEA, and therefore as active contributor to the quality 
and richness of public debate in the United States.317 According to Fiss, 
Pacific Gas & Electric "affirm[ed] the right of citizens not to have their 
property used by the government to support an activity they detest."318 
mid. 
311 /d. at 22. 
312 /d. at 21-22. 
313 /d. at 4. 
314Frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 79. 
315 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
316frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 79. 
317 See id. at 76-78. 
m !d. at 77. 
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Under the logic of that decision, allocative state programs such as the 
NEA and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting might be rendered 
unconstitutional. 319 The consequences of such a ruling would be dire: 
"In that instance, the allocative state will, as a matter of constitutional 
law, have been brought under the same regime that now governs the 
regulatory one; free press will have become reduced to free enterprise, 
and the fate of our democracy will be placed wholly in the hands of 
the market. "320 
For Fiss, that would be an extremely undesirable outcome. Others, 
of course, would celebrate this development as the final step of First 
Amendment law working itself pure. 321 Let us assume for purposes of 
productively addressing Fiss's arguments, however, that we want to 
prevent such an expansive reading of Pacific Gas & Electric, that we do 
not agree with Justice Scalia's aggressive application of the principle 
of content neutrality in RA. V. v. St. Paul or with what Fiss calls Justice 
Rehnquist's indifference "to the effects allocative decisions might have 
upon the robustness of public debate. "322 Let us agree, in short, that 
we wish to avoid a purely libertarian First Amendment. What should 
we do to prevent such an outcome? Fiss's answer is clear. The tradi-
tional First Amendment that minimizes state involvement in speech 
matters must be abolished and replaced by a regime in which the state 
acts to whatever extent necessary to bring about robust public de-
bate.323 This response is untenable. Fiss has simply failed to demon-
strate that furthering public debate in American society requires the 
radical steps that he has outlined, or that the costs and risks associated 
with such steps are compensated for by the gains under a Fissian 
system. 
Sometimes reality shines through cracks that appear even in the 
carefully chiseled surface of Fiss's argument. I do not mean the ac-
knowledgment "that the state can be both an enemy and a friend of 
speech; that it can do terrible things to undermine democracy but 
some wonderful things to enhance it as well. "324 Rather, what I am 
319 See id. at 77-78. 
32° See id. at 78. 
321 See, e.g.,John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 56 (1996). 
322 FISS, IRONY, supra note 1, at 46. 
323 See, e.g., id. at 49. 
324 /d. at 83. Statements such as this one are not much more than window dressing. Mter all, 
if the state can be so dangerous, if the truth about the state's role is indeed so "complicated," 
then why craft a theory that, by its own logic, wholeheartedly and unreservedly embraces the 
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addressing here are the moments where the true complications and 
impracticalities of his proposed new regime make themselves felt. For 
example, Fiss realizes that "[s]ly politicians may say that they are regu-
lating contentin order to enrich public debate and to make certain 
that the public hears from all sides, but their purpose may, in fact, be 
to determine outcome or further certain policies. "325 That, indeed, is 
one of the great risks of a system in which the state meddles with the 
opinions of and the debates among its citizens. Even if we all agreed 
with Fiss that the state would be a wonderful quality-enhancer of public 
debate, we would still have to refrain from using the state for that 
purpose as long as we concluded that the risks of abuse were too great. 
Fiss's answer to the problem that he has raised, however, is unlikely to 
ease anyone's concerns about such abuses. He proposes designing the 
institutions that regulate speech content to ensure a balanced debate 
in such a way as to "remove[] them from the political fray. "326 There is 
not a hint as to how that is to be accomplished. As Fiss states correctly, 
politicians often tend to be "sly. "327 One should expect any agency 
entrusted with regulating speech to be subject to immense political 
pressures. In all likelihood, the non-political status of such an agency 
would be subverted by "sly" politicians in short order. Fiss's naive 
reliance on such an institution is thus not an acceptable solution.328 
In order to overcome this obvious problem, Fiss turns to the 
courts.329 He invokes judicial supervision of the governmental bureauc-
racy that would implement the new First Amendment, while acknow-
ledging that this would be a "heavy burden" on the courts. 33° Fiss 
proposes the following criterion to guide the courts: 'Will the regula-
state, a theory that empties the First Amendment of any principled means of keeping the state 
out of speech affairs? See id. Fiss's theory knows nothing about the dangers of state interference 
in speech matters. 
325 /d. at 24. 
326 /d. 
327Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 24. 
328 Fiss's invocation of a non-political speech agency demonstrates the fundamental shortcom-
ing of his value approach. That shortcoming consists of the necessity to have an ultimate authority 
decide what the relevant values are and how they are to be interpreted and applied. In short, as 
Fiss's appeal to such an authority makes clear, the value approach depends on rule by "a bevy of 
Platonic Guardians." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958) ("For myself it would be 
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, 
which I assuredly do not."). 
329 See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 24. 
330 /d. 
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tion actually enhance the quality of debate, or will it have the opposite 
effect?"331 
It is hard to imagine a less helpful test. The burden on judges would 
indeed be "heavy. "332 How is a judge supposed to know whether a 
certain regulation will enhance the quality of debate? Apart from the 
question of what the term "quality of debate" might actually mean, this 
seems to be an intensely fact-specific issue with respect to any given 
regulation, one that does not lend itself to the creation of a sound and 
intelligible body of precedent. Such questions concerning the substan-
tive quality of public debate probably cannot be decided in an accept-
ably objective, nonpolitical fashion. 333 
Fiss himself provides a convincing, if perhaps involuntary, demon-
stration of the impracticality of his proposed new First Amendment. 
He explains that the silencing effects of hate speech and pornography 
"depend on a more subtle psychological dynamic-one that disables 
or discredits a would-be speaker. "334 Grappling with the issue of court 
supervision of state-ordered correctives for such subtle dynamics, Fiss 
continues: 
In the specific case that comes before the court, the dynamic 
might not be present, or the chosen correctives might be 
clumsy, causing more distortions in public debate than they 
331Jd. 
332 /d. 
333 Remember in this context the discussion, supra at 55-57, about the German Constitutional 
Court's 1991 broadcast decision and the Court's reaction to the argument that an important 
societal voice (the ''Vertriebene") had been excluded from an editorial board that supposedly 
represented the breadth and diversity of that state's spectrum of opinions. See 83 BVerfGE at 
283-85, 337-38. Note also Sunstein's recent admonition concerning the practical problems of 
Fiss's (and his own) First Amendment theory: 
Some philosophers think, for example, that a free speech principle that places a special 
premium on political discussion is extremely attractive. But judges may not be able to 
agree on this idea, and some degree of agreement is indispensable in light of the fact 
that cases have to be decided. Perhaps too a political [sic.] approach to the First 
Amendment would be too readily subject to abuse in the real world. Perhaps any 
judgment, within human institutions, about what counts as "the political" would be too 
biased and unreliable to be acceptable. For good institutional reasons, we might adopt 
a free speech principle of a low-level or philosophically inadequate sort simply because 
that approach is the only one we can safely administer. In this way there may be a 
significant split between a philosophically convincing account on the one hand and a 
legally correct approach on the other. 
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 200, at 82--83. 
334 FISS, IRONY, supra note 1, at 25. 
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cure. The traditional remedy-more speech-might be far 
better. It is hard to be certain about these matters, especially when 
operating at this level of abstraction. 335 
139 
This passage shows how difficult it would be for the courts to admin-
ister a Fissian First Amendment and how little guidance Fiss gives the 
courts in the free speech realm.336 But the passage does more than that. 
It reveals the hollowness at the heart of Fiss's theory.337 The high level 
of abstraction at which Fiss operates prevents him from even beginning 
to resolve the problems that his argument creates.338 The central strat-
egy that allows Fiss to develop his theory in the first place-a persistent 
focus on abstract values-now prevents him from addressing the the-
ory's most profound problems. Fiss's argument falls apart as soon as it 
is pinned down, forced to become concrete, to give satisfactory expla-
nations of the empirical questions it raises and to outline the specific 
legal regime it would engender. 
There is an interesting passage in Fiss's book in which he discusses 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC339 and New York Times v. Sullivan. 340 
Fiss harmonizes these foundational First Amendment cases in the 
following way: 
... Red Lion was not at war with New York Times v. Sullivan. 
These decisions were in tension in operational detail: Sullivan 
kept the state at bay, while Red Lion embraced the state. But 
Red Lion was handed down by the same Court during the 
same historic period as Sullivan and rested on Sullivan's 
animating principle. Red Lion and Sullivan were seen as com-
panions, as two complementary strategies for furthering the 
democratic mission of the press and, as such, as part of the 
same system of free expression. 341 
Fiss's analysis is clear. Both cases are motivated by the same set of 
values. In the Fissian First Amendment world, they are therefore iden-
tical in relevant part.342 They are in harmony because their "animating 
335 /d. (emphasis added). 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
338 It is remarkable how quickly Fiss gives up resolving this defect in his theory: the problem is 
no sooner recognized that it is already dropped. 
339 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
340 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
341 Fxss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
342 See id. 
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principle" is the same.343 The differences between them are merely a 
matter of "operational detail. "344 This is perhaps the most startling 
remark in the entire book, and a revealing piece of analysis. It confirms 
that what really matters to Fiss is underlying value. Value is the salient 
part of a judicial decision. When two decisions have the same value, 
they are in harmony: "Red Lion affirms the very same values pro-
claimed by Sullivan. "345 Who cares whether their rulings, their real-
world effects, are diametric opposites? These real-world effects-"Sul-
livan kept the state at bay, while Red Lion embraced the state"346-are 
no more than "operational details. "347 
Fiss's harmonizing of Red Lion and New York Times v. Sullivan once 
again demonstrates the power and efficacy of the value focus. Just as 
the German Constitutional Court's focus on the values underlying the 
freedom of broadcast allowed it to avoid contemplating the realities of 
the broadcast regime that it was mandating,348 and just as Sunstein's 
Madisonian value commitments lead him to turn the state action 
requirement into its contrary,349 so can Fiss virtually disregard the 
concrete effects of two opposite speech rulings because he views them 
in harmony at the level of ultimate value pursued by both. 350 But a legal 
regime does not solely consist of, nor is it reducible to, the values and 
philosophical justifications underlying it. It functions in the real world, 
structuring and affecting the behavior of people and organizations. 
When two legal rulings conflict on that concrete level in the way that 
Red Lion and New York Times v. Sullivan do, no appeal to philosophical 
deep structures can, by itself, resolve the conflict or deflate its sig-
nificance into that of "operational detail. "351 
Fiss concedes, of course, that the state can be both friend and enemy 
of speech when he states: 
We must learn to embrace a truth that is full of irony and 
contradiction: that the state can be both an enemy and a 
friend of speech; that it can do terrible things to undermine 
545 ld. at 58. 
544 /d. at 57. 
545 ld. at 58. 
546 FISS, IRONY, supra note 1, at 57. 
547Jd. 
548 See supra notes 14S-50 and accompanying text. 
549 See supra notes 260-74 and accompanying text. 
550 See Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
551 /d. at 57. 
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democracy but some wonderful things to enhance it as well. 
This, I fear, is a complicated truth, far more complicated than 
we have allowed ourselves to admit for some time now, but 
which is still-! hope-not beyond our reach.352 
141 
The true irony of The Irony of Free Speech is, however, that it does not 
even begin to acknowledge this "complicated truth," that Fiss's theory 
cannot address any of the complications it raises because its focus on 
value forecloses their consideration. The theory with which Fiss seeks 
to accommodate the multifaceted nature of his free speech truth, then, 
does not in fact capture the complexity that Fiss diagnoses. On the 
contrary, Fiss's theory proceeds as if there were no complications to 
be acknowledged, as if the state were a perfectly inoffensive and reli-
ably neutral actor, to be called on freely and at will for the greater 
social good. Fiss's theory, by its own logic, wholeheartedly embraces 
the state and imposes an affirmative duty on the state to act, to legislate, 
to regulate, in furtherance of a First Amendment redefined according 
to Fissian parameters.353 Fiss's theory annihilates the defensive dimen-
sions of the traditional First Amendment by transforming it from a 
negative freedom into an obligation on the state to safeguard and 
realize the values of free speech. Given that the state "can do terrible 
things to undermine democracy,"354 this is simplistic as well as danger-
ous. 
D. justice Breyer and the Value Approach to the First Amendment 
Analyzing the Supreme Court's first decision in Turner Broadcasting, 
Fiss regrets that "[a]ll that unified the Court was a distrust of govern-
ment."355He notes that "[u]nder these circumstances, it is hard to think 
of Red Lion and its endorsement of state power as anything other than 
a stray, living at the margins of the law, a formal vestige of another era, 
soon to be overtaken by technological advances that will shrink almost 
352 ld. at 83. 
353 There is a difference between the inherent logic or dynamic of an argument and the 
intended boundaries that the argument's author sets around it. Fiss himself believes that the logic 
of a legal concept will ultimately assert itself; note, for example, his discussion of Pacific Gas & 
Electric: "In Pacific Gas & Electric itself, Justice Powell's opinion contained a single sentence 
disclaiming any intent to limit the state's power to allocate .... Yet I wonder whether, in time, 
the logic of the decision will overwhelm his disclaimer." ld. at 77. I believe that the inner force 
of the Fissian First Amendment revolution sweeps away Fiss's own cautionary statements. 
354 ld. at 83. 
355frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 70; see also Turner/, 512 U.S. 622. 
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to nothing the practical significance of the domain it controls."356 Fiss 
views Turner I as a meaningless battle between the majority and the 
dissenters about whether the must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable 
Act were content regulation, noting that Justice Kennedy's plurality 
opinion argued almost desperately that they were not. 357 For Fiss, there-
fore, Turner I merely "revealed how empty a precedent &d Lion had 
finally become. "358 
Sunstein, in a 1995 article,359 takes a much more positive view of 
Turner I than Fiss. For him, the decision represents not just an empty 
doctrinal battle among anti-government dogmatists. Rather, he seizes 
on the "Court['s] suggest[ion] that a content-neutral effort to promote 
diversity may well be justified," concluding that "the Turner opinion 
contains an echo, albeit a faint one, of the highly Madisonian analysis 
in &d Lion. "360 Based on these insights, Sunstein reaches the following 
conclusion: 
There is therefore an important paradox at the heart of the 
Turner model. The paradox emerges from (a) the presump-
tive invalidity of content-based restrictions, accompanied by 
(b) the insistence by the Court on the legitimacy of the goals 
of providing access to a multiplicity of sources and outlets for 
exchanges on issues of local concern. This is a paradox be-
cause if these goals are legitimate, content-based regulation 
designed to promote them might well be thought legitimate 
too.361 
S56frss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 72. 
ss? /d. at 73-74. 
sss /d. at 69. 
ss9 Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE LJ. 1757 ( 1995) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Cyberspace]. A shortened version of this article is included as an afterword in SUNSTEIN, 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 253-75. 
soo /d. at 1778. 
S61 /d. In subsequent portions of the article, Sunstein provides a highly sophisticated analysis 
of why Turner ls insistence on content-neutrality might actually be preferable to content regula-
tion along Madisonian lines: 
We might thus offer a cautious defense of the Turner model over the Madisonian model. 
The defense would depend on the view that the Turner model may well best combine 
the virtues of (a) judicial administrability (a real problem for Madisonians), (b) appre-
ciation of the risk of viewpoint discrimination (a real problem for Madisonians too), 
and (c) an understanding of the hazards of relying on markets alone (addressed by 
Turner insofar as the Court allows Congress considerable room to maneuver). For this 
reason, the Turner model may well be better, at least in broad outline, than the 
Madisonian and marketplace alternatives. 
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Justice Breyer's concurrence in Turner J/362 strongly focuses on the 
Madisonian dimensions that Sunstein found in Turner I and should do 
much to alleviate Fiss's despondency about the marginalization of Red 
Lion. This concurrence constitutes an attempt to solve the "paradox at 
the heart of [Turner 1] "363 by resorting to an unconditional commit-
ment to Madisonianism in the Sunsteinian sense and to a Fissian 
embrace of the state as the promoter of First Amendment values.364 
Justice Breyer pays absolutely no heed to Sunstein's carefully differenti-
ated acceptance of Turner I which found merit in both the Madisonian 
and the defensive aspects of that decision,365 and instead adopts the 
value approach ofFiss and Sunstein, in his incarnation as the orthodox 
Madisonianist, to the letter. 366 
Justice Breyer concurs in the opinion of the Court in order to 
emphasize his reliance on a speech value rationale, rather than on 
Justice Kennedy's preferred economic rationale. Justice Breyer rea-
soned: 
My conclusion rests, however, not upon the principal opin-
ion's analysis of the statute's efforts to "promot[e] fair com-
petition," ... but rather upon its discussion of the statute's 
other objectives, namely "' ( 1) preserving the benefits of free, 
/d. at 1779. Sunstein ultimately justifies his cautious preference of the "paradoxical" approach in 
Turner I and his lack of dogmatism with respect to his Madisonian values with the following 
thought: 
Often participants in legal disputes, and especially in constitutional disputes, disagree 
sharply with respect to high-level, abstract issues; the debate between Madisonians and 
marketplace advocates is an obvious illustration. But sometimes such disputants can 
converge, or narrow their disagreements a great deal, by grappling with highly particular 
problems. In other words, debate over abstractions may conceal a potential for produc-
tive discussion and even agreement over particulars. Perhaps this is a strategy through 
which we might make much progress in the next generation of free speech law. 
/d. at 1796. This thought is at the heart of LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT, supra 
note 200. What makes The First Amendment in Cyberspace such a fascinating piece is that it 
exemplifies an unresolved conflict in Sunstein's thinking. This article makes use of the value 
dogmatism of DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (see particularly an approving 
reference to the broadcast decisions of the German Constitutional Court, Sunstein, Cyberspace, 
supra note 359, at 1788 n.130), but it also indicates that Sunstein is willing to forego theoretical 
perfection for the sake of "productive discussion and even agreement over particulars." Sunstein 
fails, however, to forge a synthesis of these two conflicting approaches. 
S62 Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 120~4. 
sss Sunstein, supra note 359, at 1778. 
364 See supra Parts III (B) and III (C). 
S65 See supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text. 
S66See supra Parts III(B) and III(C). There is no need here to analyze the other opinions of 
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over-the-air local broadcast television,'" and "' (2) promoting 
the widespread dissemination of information from a multi-
plicity of sources.'"367 
The consequences of this resolute value focus are predictable. The 
First Amendment ends up on both sides of the lawsuit: 
I do not deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the 
"guarantee" [of over-the-air public access to a multiplicity of 
information sources] extracts a serious First Amendment 
price .... This "price" amounts to a "suppression of speech." 
But there are important First Amendment interests on the 
other side as well. The statute's basic noneconomic purpose 
is to prevent too precipitous a decline in the quality and quan-
tity of programming choice for an evershrinking non-cable-
subscribing segment of the public .... This purpose reflects 
what has "long been a basic tenet of national communications 
policy," namely that the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public .... That policy, in turn, seeks to 
facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, 
which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago, demo-
cratic government presupposes and the First Amendment 
seeks to achieve .... With important First Amendment inter-
ests on both sides of the equation, the key question becomes 
one of proper fit. 368 
Devotion to Madisonian values and extension of the First Amend-
ment-via a focus on value-to all sides of the dispute leads Justice 
Breyer to his central ruling in Turner II: "I believe that [the statute's] 
purpose-to assure the over-the-air public access to a multiplicity of 
information sources ... -provides sufficient basis for rejecting appel-
lant's First Amendment claim."369 
Turner II since they by and large play out along the familiar lines set forth by the Justices in 
Turner L The truly novel event of Turner Ilis indeed justice Breyer's concurrence. 
367 Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1203-{)4. 
368 Id. at 1204 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
369 Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is true that justice Breyer does not end his 
inquiry with this holding, but engages in a very brief discussion of the "bottleneck" problem that 
cable systems supposedly create. Id. at 1204-{)5. However, in light of justice Breyer's unqualified 
reliance on the "purpose" of the statute to resolve this case, I regard his cursory attention to 
"bottleneck" issues as being of secondary importance. 
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This ruling constitutes a resounding endorsement of Sunstein's and 
Fiss's theories.370 It is premised on the idea that "[t]he issue of consti-
tutional validity should be assessed in [the functional equivalent of] 
Madisonian terms. "371 By accepting the "suppression of speech "372 ef-
fected by compulsory carriage, it subscribes to the notion that the state 
"may ... have to silence the voices of some in order to hear the voices 
of the others. "373 By allowing the statute's purpose to override the 
appellants' First Amendment claim, the ruling explicitly substitutes the 
"ends and purposes of the First Amendment"374 for the "express provi-
sions of the First Amendment. "375 Justice Breyer relies on the Red Lion 
decision in making this substitution.376 In so doing, he rejects Justice 
Kennedy's limitation of Red Lion to traditional electromagnetic broad-
casting and the concomitant refusal to apply Red Lion to cable televi-
sion.377 In other words, Justice Breyer liberates the value approach to 
the First Amendment from scarcity rationales that would be vulnerable 
to technological obsolescence, making it universally applicable. All this 
is rather reminiscent of the German freedom of broadcast. As we have 
seen, the freedom of broadcast "serves the task of guaranteeing free 
and comprehensive opinion formation through broadcast" and is 
therefore "primarily a freedom in service of the freedom of opinion 
formation. "378 By substituting First Amendment values for First Amend-
ment rights and by eliminating the limiting principle of scarcity, Justice 
Breyer has created a faithful mode_l of the German freedom of broad-
cast. 
E. The Feasibility of Partial Regulation 
Both Germany and the United States have dual constitutional rules 
for the mass media, allowing or commanding regulation for broadcast 
but prohibiting it for the press.379 In the jurisprudence of the U.S. 
370 See id. 
371 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 36. 
3'72 Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1204. 
373Fiss, IRONY, supra note 1, at 4. 
374 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
375 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254. 
376 Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1204. 
377 In Turner I, Justice Kennedy reasoned: 'The justification for our distinct approach to 
broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium." 512 
U.S. at 637. 
378 57 BVerfGE at 320. 
379 See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court, the following two holdings, both centrally important 
interpretations of the First Amendment, exemplifY the dichotomous 
nature of this field of law: 
However much validity may be found in these arguments [of 
the access advocates], at each point the implementation of a 
remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls 
for some mechanism, either governmental or consensual. If 
it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a con-
frontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment 
and the judicial gloss on the Amendment developed over the 
years .... 
. . . A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, 
but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution 
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated. 380 
Compare this to the following conception of the First Amendment: 
But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech 
by radio and their collective right to have the medium func-
tion consistently with the ends and purposes of the First 
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not 
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount .... It is 
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences 
which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be 
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.381 
The first passage, focusing on the press, implicates the "express provi-
sions" of the First Amendment, while the second passage, discussing 
broadcast, implicates the First Amendment's "ends and purposes." The 
"express provisions" rule prevents regulation, while the "ends and 
purposes" rule commands it. 
Lee Bollinger has provided a sophisticated theory that attempts to 
integrate these disparate strands of mass media law into a complex and 
multi-layered view surveying the doctrinal interactions between the 
strands as well as the communications between the Supreme Court and 
580 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-56 (emphasis added). 
58! Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added). 
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mass media speakers. 382 Bollinger ultimately welcomes the seemingly 
dichotomous nature of First Amendment law in this area, arguing that: 
[b ]y permitting differential treatment of these institutions 
[press and broadcast], the Court can promote realization of 
the benefits of two distinct constitutional values, both of 
which ought to be fostered: access in a highly concentrated 
press and minimal government intervention. Thus neither 
side of the access controversy emerges victorious. The Court 
has imposed a compromise, not based on notions of expedi-
ence but on a reasoned, principled, accommodation of com-
peting First Amendment values.383 
Bollinger's insight-that the two regimes do not just passively coexist 
but in fact are part of a complicated and multivalent First Amendment 
jurisprudence-indirectly strengthens the case for broadcast regula-
tion. Whatever the internal flaws of the arguments in favor of broadcast 
regulation, it may be inappropriate to look at them in isolation. It is 
possible that the benefits that flow from having a regime of partial 
regulation outweigh the losses from the flaws and shortcomings of the 
pro-regulation arguments. Moreover, it is possible that these arguments 
are really just conceptual crutches, awkward accommodations made in 
the face of a powerful "central image"384 in order to express and realize 
important values that the central image does not easily accommo-
date. 385 If the traditional rule is an illusion, or at least a gross simplifica-
tion of the existing constitutional reality, then taking it as the definitive 
rule of First Amendment law may constitute a serious misunderstand-
ing of the real sweep of constitutional adjudication in this area. 
These are some of the objections that a defender of the partial-regu-
lation status quo, like Bollinger, would make to anyone who proposes 
a fundamental decision in favor of one or the other strand of mass 
media law. His proposal is to desist from making such blunt decisions, 
and instead to move towards a full appreciation of the interactions 
between the dichotomous rules as well as of the complexities within 
382SeeLEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991). 
383 Id. at 116. 
384 Id. at 1. 
385 In this way, a Bollingerian analysis of the German situation and of what I have called the 
unreasoned differential treatment of broadcast and press might suggest that I am missing the 
larger picture. Such an analysis might try to find underlying themes, interactions, and cross-cur-
rents, between the Constitutional Court's press and broadcast jurisprudence, and it might even 
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each strand.386 Bollinger's argument is subtle and powerful; I cannot 
fully do it justice here. His argument, however, suffers from a serious 
weakness. In order for Bollinger's integrated and complex theory to 
work, he must presuppose some sort of plausible distinction between 
press and broadcast. When he writes that "the very similarity of the two 
major branches of the mass media provides a rationale for treating 
them differently,"387 he is, inadvertently perhaps, hinting at a limiting 
principle of his theory. Because the two branches have similar func-
tions in the public realm, the values each achieves within itself can 
cross-fertilize and spark desirable developments in the other while 
simultaneously keeping its own drawbacks in check. Were the two 
branches to be largely incommensurate, then the central virtue of the 
dual system, namely, the possibility of promoting distinct constitutional 
values, would drop out of the picture, and Bollinger's theory would 
not work. Thus, some degree of similarity is one limit on the feasibility 
of Bollinger's theory. There is, however, a limit on the other side as 
well. If broadcast and press have always been much more similar than 
the Supreme Court has assumed, if thus the differential treatment of 
them has always been based on a deeply flawed view of broadcast, 388 
then Bollinger's argument serves to solidifY and glorifY a mistake, an 
immature and confused view of the electronic media. 389 This consoli-
dation and entrenchment of an ill-considered approach to a new 
technology might be justifiable by virtue of the benefits that flow from 
a dual regime as such, irrespective of the wisdom or lack thereof 
underlying one branch, as long as the empirical reality of broadcast 
be successful in such a search, despite the fact that the Court itself has not developed an explicit 
and full-fledged theory for the dichotomy. 
386 See BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 116--20. 
387 /d. at 116. 
388 Lucas R. Powe argues that at the root of the differential treatment of broadcast and press 
was simply a pervasive feeling that broadcast is somehow not as worthy of First Amendment 
protection as the press. 
Gone [by 1943] was the FRC ... claim that broadcasting was unworthy of First Amend-
ment protections. In its place had sprung up a newer and more elaborate version of the 
same claim: broadcasting was entitled to some First Amendment protections, but its 
special characteristics demanded a different First Amendment, one regulated by the 
federal government. The difference in the form of the argument, however, could not 
disguise the substantive constancy. Neither the FRC nor the FCC had the slightest doubt 
that the traditions of the print media did not apply to broadcasters. The argument was 
simply recast to suit a new era. 
LUCAS R. PoWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 31-32 (1987). 
389 See id. 
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and press were reasonably stable and unchanging. If the two branches 
operated the way they did in, for example, the 1960s and 1970s, and 
if it were quite clear that they would remain that way for the foreseeable 
future, then Bollinger's calculus might work.390 
In reality, broadcast and press are not static. On the contrary, they 
are developing wildly and explosively, propelled by technologies that 
were unimaginable only a few years ago, acquiring and disseminating 
information at ever increasing quantity, speed, and efficiency. In the 
process, they are becoming ever more like each other. They con-
verge.391 The phenotypical distinctions between the press (that which 
we find in front of our doors every morning) and broadcast (such as 
that which appears on our television screen at night) are becoming 
less important. The information gathering process of the press, and 
even the printing process, are dependent upon electronics. Virtually 
every newspaper may be read via one's computer. Technologically, 
press and broadcast are converging upon the same form. 
In order for a dual regime to make sense, the two branches must be 
significantly differentiated. Otherwise the duality is simply arbitrary. 
Assume a world with only one mass medium. Furthermore, assume that 
ownership is diversified, that there are national and local entities, and 
that competition functions acceptably. In a situation like this, partial 
regulation cannot be the solution. How would we determine who is to 
be regulated and who is to be left alone? By lottery? In a unified system, 
the method of realizing divergent values by using differential constitu-
tional rules is inapposite, and another way of achieving the desired 
values must be devised. Press and broadcast are developing toward a 
unified system, increasingly depriving the partial regulation scheme of 
its empirical foundations, which have always been tenuous to begin 
with.392 
Therefore, Bollinger's static acceptance of the existing technological 
realities, his failure to take the convergence of press and broadcast into 
390 See BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 153 ("Up to now the system has thrived on an intellectual 
posture in which the fundamental premises of each branch are treated as utterly discrete and 
largely self-evident."). 
391 See generally ITHIEL DE SoLA PoOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983). 
392 See BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 153. Bollinger realizes that the premises of his theory are 
becoming more and more tenuous. He believes that one cost of the dual regime is: 
!d. 
that the implicit assumption about the need to locate a material difference to justify a 
system of differential treatment is now causing the fictions employed to outdo good 
sense, as public policy in this area is being reconsidered. 
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account, and his acquiescence in the Supreme Court's lack of under-
standing of the broadcast medium,393 make it clear that the partial 
regulation theory has limited viability. 394 Bollinger's theory was a late 
effort at distilling some value from the dual regime, whose premises 
were unstable from the outset. Perhaps he succeeded with respect to 
the situation approximately up to the 1980s. His argument is most 
applicable to the time in which his two model cases, Red Lion and 
Tornillo, were decided. 395 Sooner or later, however, the dual regime will 
lose its empirical basis by virtue of technological transformations, and 
we will be forced to make a choice between the two approaches to mass 
media law. 396 
393 See generally id. at 108-55. Bollinger believes that his "analysis of [Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)] and [Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
(1974)] demonstrates the need to maintain a partial regulatory structure for its own sake." ld. at 
116. This reading of the cases is both too favorable and too optimistic. Bollinger is extremely 
sensitive to how different Red Lion is from the press cases. He then explains this divergence by 
identifying a deep underlying cohesion. Is there not a simpler, more plausible explanation? Could 
it not be that Red Lion was simply an example of judicial blindness? Could it not be that Powe is 
correct and that the technological differences between the two media seduced the Court into 
making a monumental mistake? Bollinger's own description of the case suggests exactly that-
which, ironically, makes his own alternative explanation seem labored: 
To read the Court's unanimous opinion in Red Lion is to step into another world, one 
that encompasses a dramatically different way of thinking about the press and about 
public regulation .... 
. . . Red Lion, therefore, reads like a tract that treats the press as the most serious threat 
to the ultimate First Amendment goal, the creation of an intelligent and informed 
democratic electorate. It is noteworthy that in its opinion the Court not once refers to 
the broadcast media as the "press," or to broadcasters as '1ournalists" or "editors." In 
the idiom chosen, broadcasters are referred to only as "licensees," "proxies," and 
"fiduciaries," or as the holders of "monopolies" capable of exercising "private censor-
ship." 
... In Red Lion, the Court acted as if it were reviewing a decision of an ordinary 
administrative agency, to which great deference had to be paid to its expertise in dealing 
with "a new technology of communication." 
ld. at 72-73. 
394 See BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 151. Bollinger hints at the possibility that the two strands 
of the dual regime will come closer together. ld. However, he seems to view this as predominantly 
a conceptual, rather than technological, development. ld. 
395 See supra note 393. 
396 See Adelman, supra note 271, at 1339. Adelman makes a similar point, but with a slightly 
different emphasis: 
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F. The Substantive Critique of the American Broadcast System and the 
Elitist Fallacy 
151 
Regulation advocates often undervalue the quality and accomplish-
ments of the current media output and overvalue the problems of, and 
risks associated with, these media. As a consequence, their arguments 
in favor of media regulation are weakened. Sunstein's book is a vivid 
example of this phenomenon. Sunstein provides the following sum-
mary of his key complaints about current media output: 
But it would not be an overstatement to say that much of the 
free speech "market" now consists of scandals, sensationalized 
anecdotes, and gossip, often about famous movie stars and 
athletes; deals rarely with serious issues and then almost never 
in depth; usually offers conclusions without reasons; turns 
much political discussion into the equivalent of advertise-
ments; treats most candidates and even political commit-
ments as commodities to be "sold"; perpetuates a bland, wa-
tered-down version of contemporary morality on most issues; 
often tends to avoid real criticisms of existing practice from 
any point of view; and reflects an accelerating "race to the 
bottom" in terms of the quality and quantity of attention that 
it requires. The current system also makes it difficult for many 
views, especially dissenting views from the right or the left, to 
get a serious hearing at all. 397 
Given this sorry state of affairs, Sunstein concludes, there is nothing 
to celebrate about the American free speech system.398 Since current 
media production is so feeble, the state should intervene.399 
This type of argument is certainly not new. In fact, it is just another 
late blossoming of a time-honored tradition that arose when film and 
radio broadcast began. Lucas A. Powe aptly summarizes the courts' 
/d. 
[T]he structure of media is less and less bipolar. New forms of electronic media are 
coming "on-line" (literally) seemingly every day. At the same time, people are relying 
less on newspapers as a significant source of information. As newspapers decline in 
relative significance, their ability to serve as the unregulated safety valve envisioned by 
Bollinger will decline as well .... 
397 SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 22-23. For a more extensive treatment of these 
issues, see id. at 58-67. 
398 /d. at 23. 
399 See id. 
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reaction to claims of First Amendment protection made for very early 
motion pictures when he states: 
Thus in the first cases involving a new technology that 
claimed the protections of freedom of speech, the Court 
almost summarily rejected the argument. These were not 
newspapers: they were much closer to circus acts. And no one 
thought making a tiger jump through a flaming hoop had 
anything to do with the traditions of John Milton and John 
Peter Zenger. When the problem of radio arose a little more 
than a decade later, an identical conclusion was carried over. 
Radio programming was entertainment and thus no part of 
the exposition of ideas entitled to the protection of the First 
Amendment. 400 
In 1948, Alexander Meiklejohn published Free speech and Its Relation 
to Selj-Government.401 This book contains a ringing condemnation of 
radio, the main broadcast medium of the day. This condemnation 
voices essentially the same concerns as does Sunstein about 45 years 
later.402 It is an important statement. Meiklejohn does not just criticize 
radio programs. He formulates a standard for them that goes far 
beyond demanding thorough and diverse political coverage. He sees 
the new medium as a grand opportunity for transmitting among all 
citizens the shared values of a common life.403 This Meiklejohn quota-
tion is useful-not so much for what he thinks about the radio as it 
exists at his time, but for what he believes such a new mass medium 
should accomplish: 
400PowE, supra note 388, at 29. 
401 Al.EXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) 
(hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH]. 
402 The most aggressive and least helpful denouncement of television that I have encountered 
is that by President Kennedy's chairman of the FCC, Newton N. Minow. Minow, in a 1961 address 
to the National Association of Broadcasters, expressed his deep-seated disdain for television by 
stating: 
... [Television is] a vast wasteland. You will see a procession of game shows, violence, 
audience participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, 
blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western badmen, western good 
men, private eyes, gangsters, more violence, and cartoons. And endlessly, commercials-
many screaming, cajoling, and offending. And most of all, boredom. 
Newton N. Minow, Address to National Association of Broadcasters (1961), quoted in JONATHAN 
W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (1991). 
403MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 401, at 86-88. 
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When this newform of communication [commercial radio] 
became available, there opened up before us the possibility 
that, as a people living a common life under a common 
agreement, we might communicate with one another freely 
with regard to the values, the opportunities, the difficulties, 
the joys and sorrows, the hopes and fears, the plans and 
purposes, of that common life. It seemed possible that, amid 
all our differences, we might become a community of mutual 
understanding and of shared interests. It was that hope which 
justified our making the radio "free," our giving it the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. 
But never was a human hope more bitterly disappointed. 
The radio as it now operates among us is not free. Nor is it 
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. It is not 
engaged in the task of enlarging and enriching human com-
munication. It is engaged in making money. And the First 
Amendment does not intend to guarantee men freedom to 
say what some private interest pays them to say for its own 
advantage. It intends only to make men free to say what, as 
citizens, they think, what they believe, about the general wel-
fare. 
As one utters these words of disappointment, one must 
gratefully acknowledge that there are, working in .the ra-
dio business, intelligent and devoted men who are fighting 
against the main current. And their efforts are not wholly 
unavailing. But, in spite of them, the total effect, as judged in 
terms of educational value, is one of terrible destruction. The 
radio, as we now have it, is not cultivating those qualities of 
taste, of reasoned judgment, of integrity, ofloyalty, of mutual 
understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government 
depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force for breaking 
them down. It corrupts both our morals and our intelligence. 
And that catastrophe is significant for our inquiry, because it 
reveals how hollow may be the victories of the freedom of 
speech when our acceptance of the principle is merely for-
malistic. Misguided by that formalism we Americans have 
given to the doctrine merely its negative meaning. We have 
used it for the protection of private, possessive interests with 
which it has no concern. It is misinterpretations such as this 
which, in our use of the radio, the moving picture, the news-
paper and other forms of publication, are giving the name 
153 
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"freedoms" to the most flagrant enslavements of our minds 
and wills.404 
Whether or not Meiklejohn's critique of the radio was justified in the 
1940s, applying it wholesale to our time, as Sunstein does, is not 
supported by the facts. The modern Meiklejohn-type critique is elitist. 
It is based on an overly specific interpretation of the word "political." 
It discounts the crucial integrative function, in Meiklejohn's sense, that 
television has on modern American life. It misunderstands or misin-
terprets the nature of popular choice concerning what to watch. 
Let us agree that attention to public issues, diversity, "high-quality"405 
programming, and the fostering of a "community of mutual under-
standing and of shared interests"406 are indeed relevant criteria accord-
ing to which to judge the products of the broadcasting media. Does 
American television fall short of these demands? Not necessarily. If 
analyzed in the appropriate way, American television meets Meikle-
john's demands.407 It does so not because of the existing regulations, 
but because of broadcasters' market considerations, concerns regard-
ing ratings, and profit motives. This "quality through viewer dictate" 
(i.e., ratings) adds another important positive dimension to a commer-
cial broadcast system, namely, the voluntariness of popular choice and 
hence the broad popular support of social and political advances made 
in the commercial broadcast realm. 
When scholars such as Sunstein, Fiss, or Bollinger talk about the lack 
of political dimension of broadcasting, they have something rather 
concrete in mind. They are referring to "MTV" and reruns of "I Love 
Lucy," as opposed to public debate.408 They are referring to program-
ming motivated by monetary concerns, as opposed to programming 
motivated by the desire to provide "full and fair information about 
404 !d. 
405 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 91. 
406 MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 401, at 79. 
407 Of course there are weaknesses in television programming, even serious ones. For example, 
the low quality of children's programming, and the inordinate amount of advertising during it, 
need to be remedied. But, as I have said before, while such complaints are valid, they do not 
furnish grounds to condemn the whole broadcast enterprise. 
408 See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 5, at 788. Fiss writes: 
... Reruns of I Love Lucy are profitable and an efficient use of resources. So is MTV. 
But there is no necessary, or even probabilistic, relationship between making a profit 
(or allocating resources efficiently) and supplying the electorate with the information 
they need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy, the structure 
of government, or the nature of society. 
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public issues."409 In simple terms, they mean "low-quality fare" as op-
posed to "high-quality fare. "410 They know high-quality fare when they 
see it "because they have been educated to do so,"411 and what the 
media are currently presenting is not that.412 
These scholars are wrong. American television certainly has its share 
of "low-quality" fare, such as late-morning game shows and many talk 
shows. But on the other end of the quality spectrum, there are shows 
that deserve to be called works of art under any reasonable definition, 
such as certain episodes of "Cheers" or "I Love Lucy," and programs-
commercial mass programs-that have on occasion treated important 
political or social topics with sensitivity, depth and thorough-
ness. Prominent among such programs are, for example, "M.A.S.H," 
"Roseanne," and "The Cosby Show." 
The scholarly evaluations of television programming are often based 
on elitist closed-mindedness and class prejudice. What these men see 
on television does not correspond with their preconceived notions of 
what rational political debate is supposed to resemble. They are trained 
to value and to recognize discourse that proceeds by rational argu-
ment, by reasoned verbal exchange. They are not trained to perceive 
political substance in entertaining visual images or in argument that 
proceeds by other than the strict formal structure of intellectual debate 
or academic discourse. Assumptions are being made about what is 
/d. at 788. I do not agree with this division, and I do not agree with the implication that television 
contributes nothing of significance to supplying the electorate with political information, etc. Of 
course, the market is not perfect. Of course, it is "itself a structure of constraint." /d. at 787-88. 
But so is the state. And Fiss does nothing to convince his readers that state-imposed biases are 
less problematic than market-imposed ones. Without a comparative empirical argument in favor 
of state constraints over market constraints, combined with an equally concrete argument showing 
that state regulation of speech is less dangerous than market regulation, Fiss's embracing of the 
state is not justified. 
409BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 139. 
410 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 90. 
411 /d. at 91. 
412 This sentence is, of course, modeled on Justice Stewart's beautiful phrase in Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). In trying to determine whether a certain movie met his "hard-<:ore 
pornography" criterion, Justice Stewart honestly admitted to using his instincts as his main guide: 
"But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Methodo-
logical candor can be helpful. Justice Stewart, admirably courageous, drew attention to the 
irreducibly subjective quality of substantive judgments about speech. It is the cautionary lesson 
implicit in Stewart's approach that Sunstein, Fiss, and Bollinger have not heeded. On the margins 
(extremely violent or obscene speech, for example) some substantive judgments about speech 
plainly have to be made. But, except in such boundary situations, substantive evaluations of 
speech should be kept to a minimum, and should not be used as the methodology for evaluating 
speech in a certain area, such as the mass media. 
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"high-quality" television programming or newspaper reporting, while 
very few reasons are given why the critics' particular criteria should be 
controlling. Especially with regard to American television, the result of 
such selectivity in ascribing value is that the political and social impor-
tance of a considerable amount of programming is being systematically 
undervalued. The accuracy and reliability of the critics' empirical 
findings are thus compromised. 
Television fulfills the immensely important social function of provid-
ing a social glue and cohesion for an extraordinarily diverse and 
increasingly ethnically splintered nation. Meiklejohn touched on 
something deep, something that the later critics of broadcast tend to 
ignore.413 This is the need-for the functioning of this democracy, this 
society-to "communicate with one another freely with regard to the 
values, the opportunities, the difficulties, the joys and sorrows, the 
hopes and fears, the plans and purposes, of that common life,"414 and 
to teach the "mutual understanding upon which the enterprise of 
self-government depends. "415 
If connecting people, articulating common values and aspirations, 
and treating social and political problems are necessary functions of 
broadcasting, then the American television system is functional. There 
is probably no serial program anywhere in the world that dealt with the 
effects of war as successfully, movingly, and adequately as "M.A.S.H." 
The earlier "Roseanne" episodes were an outstanding treatment of 
working-class life and the all-important task of raising children. These 
and other shows accomplish this without any heavy-handed moralizing; 
on the contrary, they are among the funniest programs ever produced. 
They are characterized by artistic, political, and social quality. In addi-
tion, they have mass appeal. This combination gives American televi-
sion programming a social effectiveness or "reality" that is unachiev-
able, or actually prevented, by regulatory fiat. The real social gain that 
the presence of Nichelle Nichols on the original "Star Trek" or the 
recent "coming out" of Ellen DeGeneres' character on her prime time 
show and the publicity surrounding that event represents is worth 
more than programs that are socially progressive due to state man-
415 See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 401, at 86-88. 
414 /d. at 86. 
415 Id. at 87. This is not to deny the fact that cold manipulation and rampant commercialism 
permeates television. But the search for decent motives is fruitless; it is based on sentimental 
notions that are quite inapposite in a capitalist system where self-interest and profit-seeking 
function as prime social engines. 
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date.416 It is the people's voluntary acceptance of having their horizons 
expanded which makes the difference and gives the freely chosen 
programs their special value. These commercial programs must be in 
close touch with what people want to see; otherwise, they lose rating 
points. By virtue of their attention to and dependence upon their 
audience, they are likely to be more effective in achieving social aware-
ness and political communication than ratings-independent manda-
tory programs. Progress carried by the broad wishes of the people, as 
ascertained by the fact that they are watching in huge numbers, is real. 
"Progress" through authoritative intervention may really be achieving 
nothing but apathy, complacency, and lack of interest-precisely be-
cause the audience is not "responsible" for the programming pre-
sented to them, and because that programming does not need to make 
any effort to address an audience.417 
Sunstein has foreseen the elitist objection to his Madisonian recon-
ceptualization ofthe FirstAmendment.418 His counter-argument to this 
objection, ironically, accomplishes the contrary of what he intends: it 
reveals the deep and inappropriate elitism at the core of Sunstein's 
First Amendment analysis.419 Sunstein believes that the elitist objection 
"is rooted in the perception that high-quality fare is appreciated most 
by the highly educated, who are (not incidentally) the most wealthy. "420 
Sunstein agrees wholeheartedly with this perception; he just does not 
view it as a criticism.421 Of course, he argues, the well-educated probably 
will disproportionately watch that high-quality programming which his 
Madisonian regulatory system will bring to the television screen. 422 
416Nichelle Nichols' presence on "Star Trek" has been viewed as an important advance for 
black people on mainstream (white) television. "Mter enduring racial insults off the 'Star Trek' 
set, Nichols was ready to leave the cast after one season. Then she was introduced to [the Rev. 
Martin Luther] King at an NAACP fundraiser. 'You must not leave,' he told her. 'Don't you see 
you're not just a role model for little black children. You're more important for people who don't 
look like us. For the first time, the world sees us as we should be seen, as equals, as intelligent 
people."' Hardcovers in Brief, WASH. PosT, Oct. 30, 1994, at X13 (review of NICHELLE NicHoLs, 
BEYOND UHURA: STAR TREK AND OTHER MEMORIES (1994)). 
417 "Our ability to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those 
conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons. No conviction forced 
upon us can really be ours at all." Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat 
to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 233 (1992). 
418SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 90-91. 
419There is, of course, such a thing as good and appropriate elitism, and Sunstein is trying to 
claim it for his argument. 
420SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 90-91. 
421 See id. at 91. 
422 See id. at 90. 
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But so what?, he asks. Individuals who spend years studying at well-
known, elite institutions of higher learning are trained to enjoy high-
quality fare.423 In contrast, uneducated people typically enjoy low-qual-
ity fare.424 Through a form of trickle-down theory of public education, 
the whole public will benefit-we, the educated ones, will keep public 
debate up and running, and the occasional individuals "who are not 
college graduates" and sit through a high quality program despite their 
lack of intellectual preparedness "may receive disproportionately high 
benefits. "425 
This analysis is supported by little more than class prejudice, which 
becomes visible in the following phrase: ''What some people think to 
be sensationalistic anecdotes, or low-quality fare, represents the basic 
entertainment choices of many Americans. "426 Sunstein, it seems, has 
never looked at television from a perspective other than the top of an 
ivory tower. He has apparently never understood the sheer comedic 
genius and outstanding quality of yet another perfect episode of "The 
Simpsons" or "Married-with Children." These and other programs are 
representative of American television-purely commercial products, 
created for the sole reason of making money. If the market and the 
preferences of ordinary Americans can produce such outstanding 
products, then the "current system of free expression"427 is something 
to celebrate after all. 
In a later passage entitled "What is political?", Sunstein includes 
certain categories of speech into his first-tier Madisonian free speech 
structure that do not conform to the strict notion of political commu-
nication yet merit high-level protection.428 He does so "because it is 
important to create a large breathing space for political speech by 
protecting expression even if it does not explicitly and securely fall 
423 See id. at 91. 
424 See id. at 90. 
425 See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 91. 
426 Id. at 90. 
427 Id. at 23. In the same way, Fiss has used "I Love Lucy" as the representative example of 
commercial, anti-public debate programming that he wants to see remedied. F1ss, WHY THE 
STATE?, supra note 5, at 788. What he overlooks is the fact that "I Love Lucy" is of superb quality, 
and quite indistinguishable in its artistic and amusement value from a Metropolitan Opera 
simulcast of, say, "L'Elisir D'Amore" (except that more people are likely to enjoy "I Love Lucy" 
than "L'Elisir D'Amore"). If we agree with the iater Meiklejohn (and with Sunstein) that art is 
included in the "political" protection of the First Amendment, then the juxtaposition that Fiss 
proposes cannot be usefully maintained. 
428 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 152-54. 
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within that category [political speech]. "429 One might expect to find at 
least some of the politically relevant, high-quality products of American 
commercial television among the speech categories Sunstein has se-
lected. Disappointingly, however, Sunstein's examples of "art that ha[s] 
the characteristic of social commentary, "430 seem simply copied from a 
generic reading list of a Great Books college course, with a token 
controversial entry thrown in for good measure. Unsurprisingly, we 
find here Ulysses, Bleak House, Shakespeare, Wordsworth and-Map-
plethorpe.431 "Roseanne" and "Oprah," of course, did not make the list. 
They escape Sunstein's attention because he regards commercial tele-
vision as trash,432 art as that which is not normally of interest to the 
"many people who are not college graduates, "433 and "many Americans" 
as choosers of "sensationalistic anecdotes, or low-quality fare. "434 
i Closely associated with the critique of broadcast's substance is the 
argument from the "failings of intellect. "435 According to this argu-
ment, people's choices are the result of weakness of intellect or will-
power, of acculturation to the miserable program offerings, and of 
learned preference for and underdeveloped revulsion against poor 
and limited options.436 
The substance of this argument is more than one hundred years old. 
In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren stated the basic concern 
rather forcefully with respect to the press: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious 
bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer 
the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a 
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To 
satisfy a prurient taste, the details of sexual relations are 
spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To oc-
cupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle 
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the 
domestic circle ... When personal gossip attains the dignity 
of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real 
429 Id. at 152. 
430 Jd. 
431 Id. at 152-53. 
432 Id. at 90. 
433 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 91. 
434 Id. at 90. 
435 BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 139. 
436 /d. at 139-41; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 90-91. 
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interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and 
the thoughtless mistake its importance. Easy of comprehen-
sion, appealing to the weak side of human nature which is 
never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our 
neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place 
of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys 
at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feelings. No 
enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive 
under its blighting influence.437 
There are thus two sets of interests with which the people can concern 
themselves. One consists of the lazy and undisciplined tastes to which 
the mass media pander.438 The reinforcing cycle of people's prurient 
interests and the media's satisfaction of them has a detrimental effect 
on the viability of a democracy.439 The other consists of the commu-
nity's "real interests," those having to do with governmental decision-
making, political information, and education-in short, those interests 
that motivate and sustain a democracy.440 
Sunstein phrases this dichotomy in terms of "aspirations" and "con-
sumption choices. "441 The divergence between the two exists, Sunstein 
claims, because people have been habituated to expect and prefer the 
"existing fare,"442 which is identical, of course, with "low-quality fare. "443 
They have not had a chance to acquaint themselves with a better 
system, and thus to develop a preference for it.444 Because the current 
private choices are the result of unfortunate acculturation to commer-
cial broadcasting, they are not truly autonomous choices.445 Thus, a 
regulation of these choices does not infringe on autonomy interests; it 
"does not displace a freely produced desire."446 In sum, the people, 
437 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890). As 
someone who came to the United States only recently, I disagree sharply with the conclusion 
stated in the final sentences of the quotation. In my experience, enthusiasm and generosity are 
two of the defining and most reliable characteristics of Americans of all socioeconomic and ethnic 
descriptions. Since these characteristics have obviously survived and flourished despite all the 
"blighting influence" of rampant gossip being spread throughout society by the mass media, I 
must conclude that there is something fundamentally wrong with this type of criticism. 
438 See id. 
439 See id. 
44U See id.; see also, SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 19. 
441 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 74. 
442 /d. 
443 /d. at 90. 
444 /d. at 74. 
445 /d. 
446 SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 74. 'When private choice is a product of existing 
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while they are not really to be blamed for this, choose badly. If they, 
in a moment of intellectual lucidity and discipline, decide to correct 
their everyday mistakes, then the First Amendment should not stand 
in their way. Mter all, regulation against "existing fare" would be driven 
by Madisonian concerns.447 As a consequence, "at least some people 
would be educated as a result, and be more favorably disposed toward 
programming dealing with public issues in a serious way. "448 
; Bollinger discusses this particular issue as well. He views the problem 
: of people's "consumption choices" as inherent in everyday choice-mak-
/ ing as such, arguing as follows: 
[E]ven in a world in which the press is entirely free and open 
to all voices, with a perfect market in that sense, human 
nature would still see to it that quality public debate and 
decision making would not rise naturally to the surface but 
would, in all probability, need the buoyant support of some 
form of collective action by citizens, involving public institu-
tions.449 
Why would that be the case? What is it about human nature that 
inevitably depresses the quality of public discourse? Bollinger has a 
complex answer.450 He lists an impressive catalogue of human weak-
nesses, all of which can contribute to narrowness or shallowness of 
outlook, and to an unwillingness to perceive and confront adverse 
voices.451 In essence, Bollinger views the tendency to parochialism as a 
universal human characteristic, in need of constant correction.452 
options, and in that sense a product of law, the inclusion of better options, through new law, does 
not displace a freely produced desire." ld. This is too broad a statement, and it is too smoothly 
syllogistic in the way the resulting constitutional determination is reached. Something is wrong 
here: this theory makes potentially all private choices something other than "freely produced." 
When, after all, can one say that a private choice is not the "product of existing options"? 
447 See id. 
448 Id. 
449 BoLLINGER, supra note 382, at 139. 
450 See id. at 138-41. 
451 ld. 
452 See id. at 139-40. Bollinger writes: 
Even in a world of unlimited opportunities we may not be sufficiently interested in 
informing ourselves about public issues, preferring entertainment and pleasure to the 
responsibilities of citizenship, a condition that recalls Brandeis's concern about the 
debilitating effects of invasion of privacy and gossip. We may not feel sufficiently edu-
cated to know what questions to ask about certain public issues or what level of deference 
to pay to expertise. We may fear that we do not understand what possible heights can 
be reached in art or in discussion of public issues. We may wish to avoid the opinions 
of those with whom we disagree, especially those on the margins of public debate, the 
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While Bollinger's argument certainly provides an accurate descrip-
tion of many human behaviors and motivations, the extent to which it 
should have a bearing on public debate-motivated regulation of the 
media is uncertain. Even in debate-enriched programming, the remote 
control enables anybody who only wants to listen to people with similar 
viewpoints and beliefs to do just that. Nobody argues in favor of 
universally mandated watching of "radical voices. "453 Ultimately, then, 
Bollinger and Sunstein are both too pessimistic and too aspirational in ' 
their view of the "people." In their strict dichotomy between the com-
mercial and the political, ·between consumption and aspiration, there 
expresses itself a rigorous, disciplined, ethical and honorable view of 
human behavior, human education, and human progress.454 Sunstein 
and Bollinger view the choices people ordinarily make as easy, lazy, 
habitual choices, choices based on some sort ofweakness.455 Bollinger 
makes this clear when he states: 
We have good reason to be weary of ourselves, and we 
should fear not just the failures of the market system but our 
own failure of intellect. A democratic society, like an individ-
ual, should strive to remain conscious of the biases that skew, 
distort, and corrupt its own way of thinking about public 
issues. Society should be intellectually humble, in the way that 
a true education tries to inculcate respect for one's own 
ignorance and intellectual incapacities. 
We recognize that if we are left to choose on our own 
whether and how to inform ourselves, too many will neglect 
to undertake the burden of self-education, choosing instead 
to pursue more pleasant things. Or we may inform ourselves 
radical voices. As a result, there may be a diaspora of viewpoints and an unheeding of 
troubled or troubling voices. We may not think clearly about some aspects of public 
issues. We may be too concerned with avoiding the costs of reasonable choices, too 
unwilling to accept an imperfect world ... or too unconcerned about the future costs 
of our choices and reforms, to willing to see greener grass in new alternatives .... We 
may have irrational prejudices against particular groups or individuals within society. Or 
we may be unduly influenced, and have our judgements distorted, by particular kinds 
of information in specific contexts. 
/d. at 139-40. 
453 /d. at 139. 
454 SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 73-74, 90-91; BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 138-41. 
455 See SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 90-91. 
\ 
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only selectively, following the natural inclination to seek out 
those with whom we agree.456 
163 
Bollinger's aspirational vision of society is beautiful and attractive in 
its sensitive recognition of human weakness. Nonetheless, it is uncon-
vincing. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that "[t]he latent 
causes of faction457 are ... sown into the nature of man."458 Federalist 
No. 51 states that factional tendencies cannot be eliminated; rather, in 
order for a free society to thrive, they must be embraced and put in 
the active service of freedom.459 The following famous argument from 
Federalist No. 51 should go a long way toward assuaging Bollinger's 
concerns about the dangers of parochialism and of people's insuf-
ficient exposure to alternative views.460 
Whilst all authority in [the United States] will be derived from 
and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken 
into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the 
rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger 
from interested combinations of the majority. In a free gov-
ernment the security for civil rights must be the same as that 
for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multi-
plicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of 
sects.461 
According to this statement about American social structure, human 
closed-mindedness is not the problem, but the solution. 
There is another dimension to the criticism of Brandeis, Bollinger, 
and Sunstein. It deals with the pleasure aspect of broadcast entertain-
ment. Brandeis, Bollinger, and Sunstein fear what they perceive to be 
the shallowness and blandness promoted by the mass media, a kind of 
race to the bottom, to the lowest common denominator, of public 
456BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 139, 141. 
457Madison defines "faction," much in agreement with Bollinger's description, as: 
a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who 
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (1941). 
458 ld. at 55. 
459 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339-40 (James Madison) (1941). 
460 BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 138-41. 
461 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 340-41. 
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discourse.462 This fear is based on cultural misperceptions. The basic 
outlook of these critics of broadcast culture causes them to misunder-
stand what is really happening. They impermissibly universalize their 
own limited viewpoint, seeking to impose a set of very specific values 
on a society that may not share them. 
Bollinger, in particular, seems to conclude from the very pleasant-
ness of watching an entertainment program rather than a challenging 
political discussion that the former is somehow less valuable than the 
latter.463 Bollinger is deeply convinced that quality political discourse 
requires discipline, humbleness, concentration, consciousness of biases 
and so on-in short, it requires unpleasant, burdensome things.464 A 
"true education" is a burden; entertainment is pleasant.465 Therefore, 
the fact that much of broadcast programming is pleasant and easy to 
watch indicates to Bollinger its inferior quality. 
Bollinger's and Sunstein's analysis of popular choice is ultimately 
puritanical. Such an analysis comes from people who have spent their 
whole lives disciplining, forming, educating themselves, and who are 
conscious of the tremendous amount of work and energy thus ex-
pended. Such people must have a difficult time acknowledging the 
entertainment choices of the masses as anything but shallow. The 
apparent lack of discipline and responsibility in the way people watch 
television must be distressing to one who has built his life around ideals 
of discipline and responsibility.466 
Bollinger's and Sunstein's critiques are respectable but mistaken. 
Pleasure does not necessarily mean shallowness. Television's political 
dimension and quality are invisible to Bollinger and Sunstein because 
they present themselves in the guise of entertainment, of pleasure, of 
lazy preference instead of hard-won discipline. Pleasure and learning, 
entertainment and expansion of horizon, fun and political awareness 
are often smoothly blended in popular programs. But a life in a 
462BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 138-41; SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 73-74, 90-91; 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 437, at 193. 
463BOLLINGER, supra note 382, at 139-40. 
464 See id. at 139. 
465 See id. 
466 Balkin's frenetic channel-switching habits, described in the opening section of his Populism 
and Progressivism article, suggest to me a similar attitude. "Zap. On C-SPAN, there's a discussion 
of Clinton's foreign policy. I keep flipping. I check out The Simpsons again. Inside Edition. VH-1. 
I mistakenly land on C-SPAN. Oops. Zap. Zap. Zap. I keep flipping. I am being a very bad boy." 
Balkin, supra note 260, at 1940. Balkin calls this absurd activity "watching television." /d. at 1939. 
I don't. I call it evidence of a bad conscience at the idea of enjoying entertainment that is less 
than high-brow. Why doesn't he stick with "The Simpsons" and allow himself to have a good time? 
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demanding intellectual environment blinds Bollinger and Sunstein to 
the real quality of the choices that the supposedly hedonistic masses 
are actually making. Bollinger's and Sunstein's critiques are wrongly 
elitist because they are based on the systemic prejudices of an intellec-
tual class that reflexively assumes that the masses, those without a "true 
education," must be inferior choicemakers whose decisions and predi-
lections could not possibly give rise to products of high quality, high 
societal relevance, as well as excellent entertainment value. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the core of this article is a concern about the consequences of a 
certain kind of abstract systematizing in legal analysis. Legal analysis 
goes astray when a doctrinal question is transformed into a question 
purely about the values underlying the doctrine. Structuring legal 
questions in this manner is attractive. It minimizes complicated doc-
trinal and factual questions, and it makes issues grand, simple, and 
philosophically pure. In this way, Fiss achieves harmony among New 
York Times v. Sullivan and Red Lion, Sunstein transforms the state 
action doctrine into an instrument of governmental regulation of 
speech, and the German Constitutional Court reads the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of broadcast as a mandate for pervasive regula-
tion of all broadcast. 
It is obvious that Fiss and Sunstein are intensely morally committed 
to their preferred First Amendment values. Nevertheless, there has to 
be, in the interest of the integrity and stability of the legal system, a 
moral commitment to lowly legal doctrine as well. This is not to say 
that legal doctrine cannot change, even drastically. There is a differ-
ence, however, between a careful, even if pronounced, change in legal 
doctrine motivated by important value commitments, and the whole-
sale abandonment of an extremely sophisticated and well-developed 
body of doctrine on the basis of tectonic shifts performed entirely at 
the level of ultimate abstraction. Fiss's embrace of the state as friend 
of the First Amendment and Sunstein's transformation of the state 
action doctrine into an instrument of regulation in the name of Mad-
isonianism are examples of such tectonic shifts. The arguments of Fiss 
and Sunstein, and particularly those of the German Constitutional 
Court, circumvent gritty doctrinal struggle by virtue of their philo-
sophical grandeur. They are too elegant, too enamored of their own 
rationality, too disrespectful of the right to free speech. The German 
Constitutional Court is more committed to its system of ultimate values 
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than to the right of speakers freely to express themselves. Analogously, 
Fiss and Sunstein do not take the First Amendment and its grown body 
of doctrine as seriously as their own ideas about its underlying values. 
As a consequence, that body of doctrine is reduced to the status of 
"operational detail. "467 It is, however, exactly this "mundane, messy"468 
operational detail which constitutes the heart of the right to free 
speech. 
467Fiss, IRONY, supra note 8, at 57. 
468 NussBAUM, supra note 31, at 372. 
